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Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-
fly Zone Rules of Engagement'
MICHAEL N. SCHMITr*
Freed of the stalemate that resulted from opposing bipolar
superpowers wielding off-setting veto power in the United Nations
Security Council, the enforcement regime envisioned by the draft-
ers of the UN Charter in 1945 is slowly becoming a reality.1 One
of the tools that has been fashioned to coercively compel desired
norms of international behavior is the no-fly zone.2 Its use has
challenged traditional notions of sovereignty, while clarifying the
operational code regarding those actions which are appropriate re-
sponses to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of
aggression.
3
t This article previously appeared in 72 THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 239
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998).
* Lieutenant Colonel, Professor and Deputy Head, Department of Law, United
States Air Force Academy, Faculty, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San
Remo, Italy. In 1997, the author served as Staff Judge Advocate for Operation
NORTHERN WATCH, which enforces the no-fly zone over northern Iraq. The views
expressed herein are those of the author in his personal capacity and do not necessarily
represent those of the Department of Defense, United States Air Force, or Air Force
Academy.
1. On the effect of bipolarity's demise vis-&-vis the Charter security scheme, and ob-
stacles to the emergence thereof, see Michael N. Schmitt, The Resort to Force in Interna-
tional Law: Reflections on Positivist and Contextual Approaches, 37 A.F. L. REV. 105
(1994). See also W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the
Post-Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
2. On no-fly zones generally, see David E. Petersen, The No-fly zones in Iraq: Air
Occupation (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Naval War College (NWC)
library); John N.T. Shanahan, The Roles of Operational Design and Synchronization in
No-fly Zones: Tactical Success, Strategic Failure, and the Missing Link (June 1996) (un-
published manuscript on file at the NWC library).
3. The operational code is the unofficial, but actual normative system governing in-
ternational actions. It is discerned in part by observing the behavior of international elites.
Operational code is contrasted with the "myth system," the law that, according to such
elites, purportedly applies. On the distinction, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES
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This article will explore how best to craft effective and legal
rules of engagement (ROE) for no-fly zones. Rules of engage-
ment are the means governments use to set forth the circum-
stances in which their military units and personnel are authorized
to use force, and, if so, how.4 They represent the intersection of
policy, law, and operational concerns at the most fundamental
level of international relations. This is particularly true for no-fly
zone ROE, which govern operations intended to deny a sovereign
State the use of its own airspace.
Before exploring this relatively new enforcement mechanism,
two brief caveats are in order. First, it is not the purpose here to
assess the legitimacy of such zones under international law, either
generally or as to specific operations. Doing so would necessitate
an in-depth analysis of the UN Charter and customary interna-
tional law that is well beyond the purview of this article. Rather,
the goal is to highlight factors which may contribute to safe, suc-
cessful, and legal enforcement, assuming, arguendo, that a zone is
established lawfully. Second, because the rules of engagement for
no-fly zones implemented since 1991 remain classified,5 the play of
BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF
COVERT ACTION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 23-24 (1992); W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 23-35
(1987); Schmitt, Resort to Force, supra note 1, at 112-19.
4. The U.S. Rules of Engagement, described infra, are set forth in Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.02, Standing Rules of Engagement for United
States Forces (1994) [hereinafter SROE]. This document is classified SECRET, but all
portions cited herein are unclassified. Additional useful discussions of the ROE include
Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's
Primer, 42 A.F. L. REV. 245 (1997) (focusing on the SROE); Bradd C. Hayes, Naval Rules
of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis, Rand Note N-2963-CC (July 1989); John
G. Humphries, Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, AIRPOWER J., Fall 1992, at 25; W. Hays Parks, Righting the Rules of
Engagement, PROCEEDINGS, May 1989, at 83; Guy R. Phillips, Rules of Engagement: A
Primer, THE ARMY LAWYER, July 1993, at 4; J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement,
NAVAL WAR C. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 51; Stephen P. Randolph, Rules of Engagement,
Policy, and Military Effectiveness: The Tie That Binds (Apr. 1993) (unpublished manu-
script available through DTIC and on file at the NWC and Air War Cbllege libraries) (fo-
cusing on air ROE during the Vietnam War and ROE in Beirut in 1982-83); Scott E.
Smith, What Factors Affect Rules of Engagement for Military Operations Other Than
War (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file at the NWC library); Butch Thompson,
Factors Influencing Rules of Engagement and ROE's Effect on Mission (Nov. 1995) (un-
published manuscript on file at the NWC library).
5. As of 1 April 1998, Operations NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH con-
tinued. Classification of the ROE is necessary for very practical reasons. A State against
which a no-fly zone is imposed would have a much easier time of violating the zone if it
knew when enforcement aircraft would employ armed force against intruders, and, more
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ROE in actual operations will be referred to only rarely. Instead,
the article articulates broad principles which apply to no-fly zones
wherever situated. It is first necessary, however, to set the stage by
describing no-fly zones themselves.
NO-FLY ZONES
A no-fly zone is a de facto aerial occupation of sovereign air-
space in which, absent consent of the entity authorizing the occu-
pation, only aircraft of the enforcement forces may fly. 6 Violators
may be forced out of the zone or, in extreme cases, shot down.
No-fly zones should not be confused with aerial operations de-
signed to enforce economic sanctions against a target State. For
instance, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the
United Nations imposed an embargo on Iraq and Kuwait that
eventually encompassed the aerial regime.7 Such an action only
importantly, when they would not. Additionally, ROE set forth tactics for aircraft inter-
cepts and attacks on ground threats that would endanger enforcement aircrews if they
were known in advance by the target State forces.
6. Petersen explores the idea of a no-fly zone as an occupation. Petersen, supra note
2, generally. It should be noted, however, that the concept of aerial occupation is not a
legal one. In traditional humanitarian law, occupation is a term of art for physical control
by one belligerent over land territory of another (or of a State occupied against its will, but
without resistance). When an occupation occurs, rights and duties arise as between the
occupying power and individuals located in the occupied area. An aerial occupation, by
contrast, is simply a de facto, vice de jure, status in which limits are placed on a State's use
of its own airspace. Traditional occupation law is found in Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] and Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions Relating the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol Additional I]. See also
GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 811-33 (6th ed., 1992); LESLIE C.
GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 246-57 (1993); Hans-Peter
Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 209-92 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
7. The initial embargo prohibited the export or import of goods into either Iraq or
Kuwait. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990). In
Resolution 665, the Security Council authorized the use of naval force in the implementa-
tion of 661. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doe. S/RES/665 (190), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329 (1990).
See also S/PV/2938. In Resolution 670, the Security Council extended the embargo to the
aerial regime.
The Security Council ... [d]ecides that all States, notwithstanding the existence
of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of
the present resolution, shall deny permission for any aircraft to take off from
their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait
other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the
Council or the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accor-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
prohibits transit of aircraft carrying cargo into or out of a desig-
nated area. In other words, it delineates boundaries which certain
aircraft may not cross; the restriction is linear. By contrast, a no-
fly zone restricts flight within a designated area. Its coverage is
three dimensional.
Enforcement of a no-fly zone presupposes the possible use of
force in response to a violation. As the most severe sanction avail-
able in international law, the circumstances under which it may be
resorted to are highly circumscribed. By a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the UN Charter, there are but two.
The first is pursuant to a Chapter VII mandate.8 Under Arti-
cle 39 of that chapter, the Security Council determines whether a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" ex-
ists.9 When it does, the Council may "call upon the parties con-
cerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems nec-
dance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical pur-
poses.
Id
The Resolution also required States to:
(D]eny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, what-
ever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless:
a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or
Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that there is no cargo on
board in violation of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for
this purpose the aircraft may be detained as long as necessary; or
b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by
resolution 661 (1990); or
c)'The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of
UNIIMOG.
S.C. Res. 670, U.N. Doc. SIRES/670 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1334, 1335 (1990). See
also S/PV/2943 (1990). On the subject of aerial enforcement operations generally, see Mi-
chael N. Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective, 2
USAFA J. LEG. STU. 21 (1991).
8. The UN Charter regime for handling situations endangering international peace
and security is set forth in Chapters VI and VII. Chapter VI articulates measures for the
peaceful settlement of disputes; the actions provided for therein are entirely consensual.
Chapter VI operations using military forces are usually labeled peacekeeping. Though
Chapter VII contemplates peaceful steps to resolve a threat/breach of the peace or act of
aggression, it also permits the use of force without the consent of the parties in order to
maintain international peace and security. Chapter VIII allows regional organizations
(e.g., NATO) to deal with matters regarding international peace and security if so author-
ized by the Security Council. On peacekeeping, see BEYOND TRADITIONAL
PEACEKEEPING (Donald Daniel & Bradd Hayes eds., 1995); Myron H. Nordquist, WHAT
COLOR HELMET? REFORMING SECURITY COUNCIL PEACEKEEPING MANDATES (New-
port Paper No. 12, Naval War College) (1997).
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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essary or desirable. '" 10 It need not do so, however, and may pro-
ceed directly to the imposition of "measures not involving the use
of armed force," such as interruption of aerial "means of commu-
nication."11 In the event the Security Council determines that
non-forceful measures would be or have proved inadequate, it may
authorize the United Nations, regional organizations, or member
States to use force under Article 42 to restore or maintain peace.
Specifically cited in the article is "such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security ... [including] demonstrations, blockades, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations."'12 It is Article 42 that provides the specific legal
basis for the use of force in the mission accomplishment rules of
engagement for no-fly zones.
13
Should the Security Council decide to authorize military ac-
tion under Chapter VII, it may do so in one of three ways. First, it
may send in "Blue Helmets," i.e., national forces under UN com-
mand and control (C2); certain United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) operations in the former Yugoslavia, for example,
were eventually conducted under Chapter VII. 14 Alternatively, it
may defer to a regional organization to take the lead in enforce-
ment action. For instance, the NATO controlled Implementation
Force (IFOR) replaced UNPROFOR following execution of the
Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.15 Finally, the Security Council
may authorize member States to take action individually or collec-
tively to implement a particular mandate. The most notable ex-
10. Id. art. 40.
11. Id. art. 41.
12. Id. art 42.
13. Mission accomplishment rules of engagement are discussed infra.
14. The UNPROFOR mandate was originally one of peacekeeping. As the situation
in the former Yugoslavia deteriorated, however, Chapter VII sanctions were authorized.
See, e.g. S.C. Res.743 (Feb. 21, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992); S.C. Res.757 (May30,
1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992); and subsequent UNPROFOR Resolutions, such as
that allowing UNPROFOR to defend safe areas [S.C. Res.836 (June 4,1993), U.N. Doc. S
/RES/836 (1993)].
15. IFOR was authorized under Chapter VII. S.C. Res. 1031 (Dec. 15, 1995), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995). The Dayton Peace Agreement is at General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/999, annex, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996); <http://www.nato.intlifor/gfalgfa-home.htm>. A
compilation of material related to the situation in the former Yugoslavia is at <go-
pher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/11/yugo>.
1998]
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ample of this approach was Operation DESERT STORM.16
The second basis for the use of force is self-defense in re-
sponse to an armed attack. This authorization is found in Article
51 of the Charter. 17 Albeit visionary, the drafters of the Charter
were realists. Understanding that Chapter VII action might not be
feasible or likely in all circumstances, they acknowledged the in-
herent right of States to defend themselves, and other States, until
such time as the Security Council acted. Article 51 provides the
legal basis for self-defense rules of engagement in effect during no-
fly operations. 1
8
A liberal interpretation of the Charter would allow for a third
use of force, non-consensual intervention into another State for
humanitarian purposes. The legality of humanitarian intervention
in international law is an unsettled issue, for it flies in the face of
traditional notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity.19 It is
particularly controversial if conducted without the blessing of the
16. On November 29, 1990, the Security Council, in Resolution 678, authorized:
"Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15
January 1991 fully implements... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and
to restore international peace and security in the area." S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/678 (1990). The term "all necessary means" is the standard phraseology for
authorizing armed force.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to -maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Numerous international agreements and pronouncements have reaffirmed this right of
self-defense since ratification of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art.3, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (Rio treaty);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, princ. 1,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63
Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,
Oct. 10, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (Warsaw Pact Treaty).
18. Self-defense rules of engagement are discussed infra.
19. On humanitarian intervention, see FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997). See also Richard
B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations: Towards the Develop-
ment of Criteria, 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 557 (1993). For a short summary of the subject, see Felix Lopez, The
Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention, 2 USA FA J. LEG. STU. 97 (1991).
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Security Council.20 When authorized by the Council on the
ground that the internal actions in question constitute a threat to
or breach of international peace under Article 39, humanitarian
intervention is somewhat less contentious, although not universally
accepted.21 The no-fly zones over Iraq have been justified in part
on this basis.2
2
Since 1991, there have been three no-fly zone operations. 23
The first two were the products of the way the Gulf War ended. In
the cease-fire talks at Safwan, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq's
Ministry of Defense, on being informed that aircraft would not be
permitted to fly, queried whether the prohibition extended to heli-
copters. He argued that due to the conditions of the roads and
bridges following the highly effective Coalition air campaign, heli-
copter flights were necessary for transport of Iraqi officials. Gen-
eral Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to permit the use of helicopters,
although he restricted them from flying in areas occupied by Coali-
20. In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice rejected any possible
argument for U.S. actions in Nicaragua on the basis of human rights:
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situa-
tion as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be
the appropriate method to monitor or enforce such respect. With regard to the
steps actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian ob-
jective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil in-
stallations, or again with the training, arming, and equipping of the Contras. The
Court concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human
rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the
United States.
Military and Paramilitary Actions in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 13,
at 268. The Nicaragua case, regardless of the merits, is an illustration of why most of the
international community disapproves of humanitarian intervention. It is a principle sub-
ject to abuse, particularly by States in a position of strength vis-a-vis the State in which the
intervention occurs.
21. Article 2(7) of the Charter contemplates this very situation. It provides: "nothing
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER
art. 2 (7) (emphasis added).
22. See discussion infra.
23. The operation titles used here-PROVIDE COMFORT, NORTHERN WATCH, and
SOUTHERN WATCH-are those of the U.S. component of each of these combined (i.e.,
including forces of more than one country) operations. Other countries may use different
names. For instance, the United Kingdom's forces enforcing the no-fly zone over north-
ern Iraq do so as part of Operation WARDEN. Nevertheless, since the U.S. labels are
those generally used to refer to the operations as a whole, that convention is adopted here.
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tion forces.
24
Soon after the cease-fire, Kurdish groups in the north and
Shi'as in the south revolted.25 A brutal suppression of both upris-
ings followed, in which helicopters were used extensively. 26 The
Kurds fled into the harsh mountainous terrain along the Turkish-
Iraqi border. Faced with mounting international pressure to come
to their assistance, in part the product of a perception that the
Kurds and Shi'as had acted in reasonable expectation of Coalition
support,27 the Security Council adopted Resolution 688. It labeled
the suppression of the Kurds a threat to "international peace and
security in the region," insisted that Iraq allow humanitarian relief
into the area, and demanded that Iraq cooperate with the Secre-
tary-General to realize these goals.
28
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT resulted, and in April
1991 relief flights began dropping supplies to the Kurds as forces
of a 13-country coalition entered northern Iraq and established a
24. RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
9 (1993). See also MICHAEL R. GORDON AND BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERAL'S
WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF 446 (1995). President Bush
had actually made the first cease-fire offer on Feb. 27, 1991. It was immediately accepted
by the Iraqis. JOHN N. MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW
254-55 (1992). Talks between Iraqi and Coalition military leaders followed on March 2,
1991. The next day, the Security Council issued Resolution 686 formalizing implementa-
tion of the cease-fire at the international level. S.C. Res. 686 (Mar. 2, 1991), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/686 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 567 (1991). In a Mar. 3, 1991, letter from Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to the President of the Security Council, the Iraqis agreed to
accept the terms of 686. U.N. Doc. S/22320 (1991). Approximately one month later, a
much more detailed set of demands was passed as Resolution 687. S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3,
1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 843 (1991). Its terms were
grudgingly accepted by the Iraqis in letters to the Secretary General and President of the
Security Council. Letters from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Na-
tions Addressed Respectively to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, Apr. 6, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22456 (1991), reprinted in MOORE, supra, at 497.
25. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE 1991
UPRISING IN IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH (1992).
26. Not only were helicopters used, but in some cases fixed wing aircraft were em-
ployed, despite the ban thereon, to suppress the uprisings. See George Bush, Letter to
Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance with United Nation Security
Council Resolutions, WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Sept. 16,
1992, at 1669.
27. For instance, in February 1991 President George Bush seemed to call for the
overthrow of Hussein when he stated, "There's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and
that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and
force Saddam Hussein the dictator, to step down." Ann Devroy, Wait and See on Iraq,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A-15. See also John M. Goshko, Rebel Urges West to Aid
Iraqi Kurds, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1991, at A-15.
28. S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 15, 1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
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security zone from which the Iraqis were directed to withdraw. 29
In order to provide relief to Kurdish groups under attack and en-
sure the security of troops on the ground, a no-fly zone was estab-
lished by the Coalition within Iraq north of the 36th parallel. 30
The 36th parallel was an easily understood demarcation that in-
corporated much of the territory in which the Kurds lived. 31 Iraqi
forces were notified of the zone by drmarche. Thereafter, any
Iraqi aircraft, whether fixed-wing or helicopter, entering the area
without prior authorization risked being shot down.
Aircraft of Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States began flying from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to en-
force the no-fly zone. In August 1996, fighting between the two
largest Kurdish groups broke out, with the Iraqi military overtly
supporting one faction.32  Since Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT had initially been designed in part to protect the
Kurds from the Iraqis, the specter of Kurds turning to the Iraqis
for assistance caused many to rethink the viability of the opera-
tion. Soon thereafter, the humanitarian element of the mission
was terminated, the French pulled out, and PROVIDE
29. President Bush announced the operation on April 5, 1991. According to Bush it
was "designed to alleviate the plight of the many innocent Iraqis whose lives have been
endangered by the brutal and inhumane actions of the Iraqi government." George Bush,
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Iraqi Refugees (White House stmt., Apr. 5, 1991), re-
printed in DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 1991, at 233. On Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, see John
P. Cavanaugh, Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations (May
1992) (unpublished manuscript available through DTIC, and on file at the NWC and
Army Command and General Staff College libraries); David E Clary, Operation Provide
Comfort-A Strategic Analysis (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript available through
DTIC, and on file at the NWC and Air War College libraries); Donald G. Goff, Building
Coalitions for Humanitarian Operations-OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT (Apr. 1992)
(unpublished manuscript available through DTIC, and on file at the NWC and Army War
College libraries).
30. The use of helicopters against the Kurds was prevalent in the North as well as the
South, and President Bush warned the Iraqis against such use in March. Dab Balz, Bush
Criticizes Iraq's Use of Helicopters on Rebels, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at A-37. See
also Rick Atkinson, Iraq Shifts Troops to Combat Kurds, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1991, at
A-I, A-12; Johnathan C. Randal, Kurds' Spring of Hope Collapses Amid Feelings of Be-
trayal, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1991, at A-1.
31. See Ann Devroy and John M. Goshko, U.S. Shift on Refugee Enclaves, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 1991, at A-I; John E. Yang & Ann Devroy, U.S. Seeks to Protect Kurd
Refugee Areas, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1991, at A-1. Though the zone did have the effect
of protecting the Kurds, it was established in part as a security measure for the Coalition
forces on the ground in northern Iraq.
32. Operation NORTHERN WATCH Command Briefing (unclassified version) (1997)
(on file with author).
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COMFORT was renamed NORTHERN WATCH.33
No comparable humanitarian relief effort was mounted in the
south. The plight of the Shi'as was less one of starvation or expo-
sure to the elements than it was of brutal suppression. Iraqi heli-
copter operations against the Shi'as continued until August 1992,
when Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was activated to enforce
a no-fly zone south of the 32N parallel.34 As in PROVIDE
COMFORT, the operation was based on Security Council Resolu-
tion 688.35 In response to Iraqi military involvement in the inter-
Kurd hostilities, the no-fly zone was extended northward to the
33rd parallel in September 1996.36 Operation SOUTHERN
WATCH is conducted by aircraft of the United States, United
Kingdom, and France operating from bases in Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, and the United Arab Emirates.
Interestingly, Resolution 688 neither mentioned Chapter VII
nor specifically authorized establishment of no-fly zones. On its
face, it authorized no affirmative action. Further, neither
NORTHERN nor SOUTHERN WATCH is a classic Chapter VII
operation as envisioned in the Charter, i.e., a response to aggres-
sion by one State against another. Instead, they more closely re-
semble humanitarian intervention mounted by multinational
forces in response to a threat to international stability.
Despite the difficulty of fitting either operation into a neatly
framed Charter-based scheme, legal justification for them has been
based on Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 688.3 7 Reso-
33. Id. The two Kurdish groups are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The Iraqis sided with the KDP in their August 31" at-
tack on the PUK stronghold of Irbil.
34. See William H. Johnson, A Piece of the Puzzle: Tactical Airpower in Operations
Other Than War (1994) (unpublished manuscript available at the NWC library), at 12.
35. Although singling out the Kurds, 688 applied generally to all Iraqis. The resolu-
tion stated, "the Security Council ... [gjravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated
areas.., which threaten international peace and security...." S.C. Res. 688, supra note
28.
36. President William Clinton, Remarks Announcing Missile Strike on Iraq, Sept. 3,
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1641 (1996). The re-
sponse also included two separate cruise missile attacks designed to suppress air defense
facilities (OPERATION DESERT STRIKE I & II). DoD Press Release No. 190-M,
<http://www.milnet.com/milnet/dstrike/dstrike0.htm>. On Sept. 4, 1996, the President is-
sued a report to Congress in which he stated that the expansion of the southern no-fly
zone was a "reasonable response to the enhanced threat posed by Iraq." PRESIDENT
WILLIAM CLINTON, REPORT TO CONGRESS, Sept. 4, 1996.
37. Id. In the report, the President stated that the zones "were established pursuant
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lution 678 was the initial grant of authority to use force against
Iraq under Chapter VII. 38 Subsequently, Resolution 687 set forth
the terms of the cease-fire, specifically reaffirming 678 in the proc-
ess.39 Thus, so the argument goes, the 678 use of force authoriza-
tion remains intact to effectuate even subsequent resolutions, in-
cluding 688. This being so, and because 678 authorized member
States to act on their own, they were entitled to mount operations
to ensure compliance with 688. The results were Operations
PROVIDE COMFORT and SOUTHERN WATCH. With the
demise of the humanitarian component of PROVIDE
COMFORT, NORTHERN WATCH is a bit more difficult to plug
directly into this equation because of the absence of direct linkage
to the 688 circumstances. Nevertheless, the no-fly zone continues
as a de facto limit on Saddam Hussein's options against the Kurds.
Moreover, his involvement in Kurdish internecine conflict, re-
peated interference with UN weapons inspectors, alleged involve-
ment in a plot to assassinate George Bush, etc., arguably justify
keeping the pressure on him in order to limit the extent of his defi-
ance. Resolution 688, considered in light of the cease-fire resolu-
tions and Iraqi acceptance of their terms, provides a colorable le-
gal basis for doing so in the form of no-fly zones.
Much cleaner from a legal point of view is the no-fly zone that
was established over Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the London Con-
ference in September 1992, it was agreed that as a confidence-
building measure, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian as-
sistance, military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
banned.40 Nevertheless, such flights continued. In response, the
to and in support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 678, 687, and
688, which condemned Iraq's repression of its civilian population, including its Kurdish
population, as a threat to international peace and security in the region." id.
38. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 16.
39. S.C. Res. 687 & 688, supra notes 24 & 28 respectively.
40. Specific Decisions by the London Conference, Doc. LC/C7 (Final), Aug. 27, 1992,
reprinted in 31. I.L.M. 1539 (1992). Subsequently, on September 15, 1992, measures to im-
plement the decisions were agreed upon by the London Conference Working Group on
Confidence and Security-Building and Verification Measures. Report of the Secretary-
General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 1 103-109, U.N.
Doc. S/24795, Nov. 11, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1549, 1574-75 (1992). See also U.N.
Doc. S/24634, Oct. 8, 1992. Additionally, in a Joint Declaration, the Presidents of Croatia
and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to permit UNPROFOR observers at air-
fields in their countries as a confidence-building measure. Joint Statement of 19 October
1992 issued by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Cosic and President Izetbegovic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1 5, previously issued in U.N. Docs. A/47/571 & S/24702
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Security Council adopted Resolution 781 prohibiting them and
authorizing UNPROFOR to track compliance through placement
of observers at military airfields. 41 In support of the effort, NATO
Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
began monitoring the zone and passing data it collected to UN
authorities.
Violations by the Bosnian Serbs continued. In March 1993
the Security Council upped the stakes with Resolution 816. It
authorized member States:
4. (A)cting nationally or through regional organizations or ar-
rangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council
and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General
and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further
violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights... and
proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of
the flights.
It also requested:
5. (T)he Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR to coordinate closely on the measures they are
taking to implement paragraph 4 above, including the rules of
engagement ... 42
The resolution specifically cited Chapter VII of the Charter as the
basis for authorization.
Paragraph 4 is in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter, which allows the Security Council to seek the assistance
of regional organizations in enforcement actions.43 The response
came from NATO the following month in the form of Operation
DENY FLIGHT. Starting with fifty fighter and reconnaissance
aircraft, over time the operation grew to more than 200 operating
from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.44 DENY
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1581,1582 (1992).
41. S.C. Res. 781 (Oct. 9, 1992), U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992).
42. S.C. Res. 816 (Mar. 31, 1993), 11 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (emphasis
added).
43. "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrange-
ments or-agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council .... U.N. CHARTER art. 53 (1). The one exception is for the
purposes of collective self-defense pursuant to Article 51.
44. The effort did not prove particularly successful. As one commentator has noted,
[Tihe no-fly zone had not even been particularly successful at the tactical level.
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FLIGHT continued until December 1995, when responsibility for
all operations-ground, air, and sea-was transferred to NATO in
accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. 45 Thereafter, con-
trol of airspace became the responsibility of the IFOR,46 a NATO-
led force tasked with executing JOINT ENDEAVOR, the peace
implementation operation.47 In December 1996, IFOR transi-
tioned into the Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR continues to
conduct aerial operations from bases in Italy.48
Thus, of the three no-fly operations, only DENY FLIGHT
was explicitly authorized in a Security Council resolution. All
three, however, look to the UN Charter and the authority it vests
in the Council for legitimacy. Since no-fly zones violate traditional
notions of near absolute sovereignty over one's own territory, a
zone not at least arguably grounded in the Charter regime would
be unlikely to survive international scrutiny.49 That being so, it is
For example, there were over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly
zone between April 1993 and January 1994. This is a direct result of a flawed
operational design that allowed the Bosnian Serbs to fly helicopters essentially
unchallenged despite the helicopter's devastating firepower. The Bosnian Serbs
also continued to fly fixed-wing aircraft in strikes of their own against Bosnian
and Croat targets even after heavy retaliatory U.N. air strikes in September
1995.
Shanahan, supra note 2, at 15.
45. Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Military
Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Art. I. For a summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement,
see Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Summary of the General Framework Agreement, Nov. 30,
1995, <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm>.
46. With regard to airspace, the relevant Security Council Resolution provided that
under Chapter VII it was authorizing IFOR Member States,
acting under paragraph 14 [of the resolution] above, in accordance with Annex
1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compli-
ance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of
IFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzego-
vina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic.
S.C. Res. 1031 (Dec. 15, 1995), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995).
47. It also included troops from Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco. Part-
nership for Peace troops were provided by Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the
Ukraine. Background information on this topic is available in NATO, Basic Fact Sheet
No. 4: NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, March 1997,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>.
48. Background information on SFOR is available at NATO, Basic Fact Sheet No.
11, The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Apr. 1997,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/sfor.htm>.
49. The zone would be a use of force against the territorial integrity of a member
State in violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4). Consider the Corfu Channel case. British
ships were passing through the Corfu Channel in Albanian territorial waters when they
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essential to query exactly what the mandate -explicit or implicit -
is whenever considering no-fly zones. In the case of DENY
FLIGHT, the resolutions authorizing the zone made it quite clear
that the prohibitions were limited to military flights, and specifi-
cally those in the airspace over the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Any other use of force (at least vis-a-vis the no-fly zones)
not falling within these narrow boundaries would, therefore, be
questionable under international law. The sole exception is acts in
self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. In the cases of
the zones over Iraq, far greater interpretive acumen is required,
for the mandate is implicit.
Before turning to the rules of engagement, it is important to
emphasize that the use of force in no-fly zones is far from an aca-
demic question. Violations of the zones have occurred periodi-
cally, often drawing a forceful response. In December 1992, an
Iraqi MiG-25 fighter south of the 32nd parallel was downed by a
SOUTHERN WATCH F-16 Fighting Falcon. 50 The next month,
another F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-23 fighter which had crossed
the 36th parallel into northern Iraq.51 Less than a year later,
NATO jets downed four Galebs which violated the no-fly zone
over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 52 Enforcement aircraft in all of the no-
fly operations have taken ground fire from anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) or surface-to-air missiles (SAM), in many cases necessi-
tating an attack in self-defense on the AAA or missile site in ques-
tion. More seriously, during DENY FLIGHT, a French Mirage
crew was taken prisoner after ejecting and an American F-16 was
were fired upon by Albanian gunners. Several months later, two British warships were
struck by mines (made in Germany) within those waters. Therefore, the British sent in
their minesweepers to clear the mines, relying on the right of innocent passage. The In-
ternational Court of Justice found the Albanians liable on the basis that they knew of the
mines' presence but did nothing to warn the British warships. It also held the first passage
of the warships through the channel lawful under law of the sea principles. It found, how-
ever, that the minesweeping was not innocent and, therefore, violated Albanian sover-
eignty. See generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4. Interestingly, for sepa-
rate reasons, it was the United Kingdom that was awarded damages.
50. Petersen, supra note 2, at 8.
51. Combined Task Force Public Affairs, Operation Provide Comfort Fact Sheet,
July 1, 1994 (on file with author). The fact sheet details other instances in which Coalition
aircraft were threatened, and in which a forceful response ensued.
52. Fact Sheet No. 4, supra note 47. The fact sheet details other uses of force during
the operations in the former Yugoslavia. See also Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law (NA TO Action in Bosnia),
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 522-25 (1994).
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downed by a SAM.53 The gravity of no-fly zone enforcement is
perhaps best illustrated by the horribly tragic incident over north-
ern Iraq on 14 April 1994, in which two U.S. F-15 Eagles mistak-
enly shot down a pair of U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters.
Twenty-six U.S., U.K., French, Turkish, and Kurdish personnel on
board perished.
54
The use of force in each of these incidents was governed by
the rules of engagement then in effect. In the aftermath of the
Black Hawk shoot-downs, the President of the Aircraft Accident
Investigation Board concluded that, in his opinion, Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT "personnel did not receive consistent,
comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough under-
standing of the USEUCOM-directed ROE. As a result, some air-
crews' understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied
became over-simplified. ' 55 ROE problems were not the sole
cause of the tragedy, but they certainly contributed to it. As
should be apparent, carefully drafted rules of engagement are es-
sential to ensure compliance with national policy, international
law, and sound and safe tactical practices.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Underlying Bases of ROE. Rules of engagement are direc-
tives from national authorities which "delineate the circumstances
and limitations under which [forces of a country] will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encoun-
tered."56 Properly designed, they have three underlying bases that
operate in tandem and synergistically-policy, law, and opera-
tional concerns.
First, and most fundamentally, ROE are the means by which
the National Command Authorities (NCA)57 (or comparable
authority in other countries) express their intent as to how force
53. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 15. The capture nearly caused the Dayton Peace
Agreement process to breakdown.
54. On the incident, see Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report, Vol. 11,
Summary of Facts (unclassified, undated) (copy on file with author).
55. Id. at 46.
56. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Pub 1-02, 329 (1994). See also SROE, supra note 4, at
GL-15.
57. The National Command Authorities consist of the President and Secretary of De-
fense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Joint Pub 1-02, supra note 56, at
253, <http://www.dtic.mildoctrine/jel/old-pubs/jpl_02.pdf>.
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will and will not be used to achieve policy objectives. They are the
realization of Clausewitz's classic maxim that war is "a true politi-
cal instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
by other means." 58 Since the NCA cannot be in the cockpit of air-
craft monitoring a no-fly zone, ROE allow them to express their
intent regarding the use of force to those who are.
The rules of engagement must, therefore, be carefully written
so as to preclude actions that might run counter to national policy.
The process requires sensitivity to the distinction between purpose
and means. A no-fly zone is nothing more than one means to ef-
fectuate a national (or international) purpose, such as mounting a
humanitarian relief effort or keeping feuding parties apart.59 At
times, this subtle, yet critical distinction is lost in the rush to design
an impermeable no-fly zone. The proper measure for success,
however, is not the extent to which violations occur, but rather the
congruency of the operation's execution with its underlying politi-
cal purpose. Those who view it as existing in a political vacuum
risk failure by their inability to factor Clausewitzian principles into
planning. The Black Hawk shoot-down is apt evidence of the need
to be able to live with the political and policy consequences of
one's ROE. 60
The proper focus is on how rules of engagement can shape
and bound the use of force to comport with the underlying purpose
of the mandate. For instance, if the purpose of a vaguely drafted
no-fly zone Security Council resolution is simply to ensure safe
delivery of relief supplies or to keep ground attack aircraft from
giving in to the temptation to strike enemy forces held in place by
a cease-fire, then it is not necessary in the ROE to permit unarmed
civil aircraft to be engaged. A civil downing would evoke an inter-
58. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
1984). As he so perceptively noted, "the political object is the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from the purpose." Id.
59. For example, in the former case, they make execution of the relief mission free
from interference by a rogue State's aircraft and helicopters possible; in the latter, they
may prevent military actions from the air that could threaten the fragile control over an
on-going conflict.
60. Similarly, consider the political consequences had SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft
shot down one of the Iraqi military helicopters transporting Haj pilgrims returning from
Mecca or engaged Iranian aircraft that penetrated the southern no-fly zone to attack the
camps of Iranian opposition groups in Iraq. Iraqi Copters Cross No-fly Zone, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 23, 1997, at A-19; Baghdad Says Iran Bombed Exiles in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30,1997, at A-1.
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national outcry certain to endanger continuance of the operation.
By contrast, if the policy goal is to keep intense pressure on a
rogue State by denying it the use of its own airspace, then perhaps
a comprehensive ban is merited.
Much as rules of engagement are intended to help ensure that
use of military force furthers national policy, so too do they ensure
that use is lawful.61 This is the second structural element of
ROE-international law. Indeed, in the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Defense and Associated Terms, the entries "rules of
engagement" and "law of war" are cross-referenced, the only
cross-reference in either definition.
62
The determinative effect of law is reflective of both the jus ad
bellum, i.e., that law which governs when States may resort to the
use of force in their relations, and the jus in bello, that law which
limits how force may be used once resorted to. As to the former, it
has been noted that a no-fly zone is usually a non-consensual aerial
occupation of another sovereign State's airspace by force. Absent
consent of the nation in whose airspace the zone is established,
ongoing hostilities in an international armed conflict, or some form
of Security Council authorization, a no-fly zone would constitute a
breach of the enforcing State's obligation to respect the sover-
eignty of other States. It would likely be characterized by the in-
ternational community as a breach of the prohibition on the use of
force found in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 63 Moreover, even if an
61. Military lawyers (judge advocates) have long played an integral role in the devel-
opment of ROE. See, e.g., Dep't of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program
(July 10, 1979) (requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified and Speci-
fied Command Commanders to ensure ROE comply with the law of armed conflict); JCS
Memorandum MJCS 0124-88, Implementation of DoD Law of War Program (Aug. 4,
1988) (on file with author) (legal advisers are to review ROE for compliance with the
DoD Law of War Program). The requirement for legal involvement in armed conflict is
long-standing. See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV] (signatories
are to issue instructions to their forces on the Convention's annex); Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 6, art. 144 (Parties "undertake ... to disseminate the text of the present
Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, in particular, to include the
study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction .... ); Pro-
tocol Additional I, supra note 6, art. 82 ("Parties ... shall ensure that legal advisers are
available when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the
application of the convention and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be
given to the armed forces in this subject."). On the requirement for and role of legal ad-
visers, see LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 73-82 (1985).
62. Joint Pub 1-02, supra note 56, at 329 & 215 respectively.
63. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
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implicit or explicit mandate existed, enforcement exceeding the
scope of authorization would be unlawful. Thus, intentionally
shooting down a civil aircraft in a no-fly zone for military aircraft
or enforcing the zone beyond its geographical boundaries would
violate international law.
It is also possible that the actual execution of a lawful decision
to resort to force to enforce a no-fly zone could violate jus in bello
prescriptive norms, especially proportionality or necessity. The
fact that these two principles are applied in a no-fly zone does not
affect their substantive content. An act is militarily necessary or
proportionate in a particular context or it is not.
Military necessity is the principle of the law of armed conflict
that prohibits destructive or harmful acts that are unnecessary to
secure a military advantage.64 Before an action can be taken, the
actor must be able to articulate the direct military advantage that
will ensue therefrom. In other words, destruction may not be wan-
ton or of marginal military value, and military motivations must
underlie it.65 Issues of military necessity are rare in no-fly zone en-
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art.
2(4).
64. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg specifically
characterized "the wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity" as a war crime. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(b), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The of-
fense was further clarified in The Hostage Case:
[Military necessity] does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for the
purpose of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of prop-
erty to be unlawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.
Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be
some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the over-
coming of the enemy forces.
The Hostage Case (U.S. v. List), 11 T.M.W.C. 759, 1253-54 (1950). Codification of the
principle is in Article 23(g) of Hague IV, which prohibits acts that "destroy or seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the ne-
cessities of war." Hague IV, Annex, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, supra note 61, art. 23(g). Though there is occasionally some discussion as to
whether the article protects all property or only State property, both the U.S. Army and
the International Committee of the Red Cross opine that it covers any property, wherever
situated and however owned. See 2 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Pamphlet No. 27-161-2) 174 (1962); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 301 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
65. During an international armed conflict, the issue usually arises in the context of a
target that would be protected as a civilian object, but which in some way now contributes
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forcement because specific approval is usually required to strike
targets other than in self-defense. When authorization is provided,
it tends towards selection of traditional military targets directly
related to zone enforcement.
66
Whereas military necessity is a raw assessment of overall mili-
tary advantage, proportionality expands analysis by balancing the
advantage gained against the incidental injury to civilians or col-
lateral damage to civilian objects that results.67 It prohibits injury
or damage disproportionate to the military advantage secured by
the action. To illustrate, if a mobile SAM site is operating from
the middle of a village, but poses minimal risk to the operation, or
there are clear alternatives to flying through its weapons engage-
ment zone (WEZ),68 and attacking it is certain to result in signifi-
cant casualties among the villagers, it should generally not be hit.
The attack would be disproportionate. Similarly, if a no-fly zone
intended to foreclose ground attacks is limited to forbidding the
to the military effort. Since the law wishes to protect civilians and civilian objects, it im-
poses a requirement of directly contributing to an enemy's war effort before it will dis-
pense with that protection.
66. E.g., air defense related facilities as in the case of DESERT STRIKE I & II in 1996.
Transcripts of DoD Press Briefings on Desert Strike are collected at
<http://www.defenselink.mil/iraqbrief.html>. Examples of necessity questions are, never-
theless, imaginable. For instance, it would violate the principle of military necessity to de-
stroy an electrical generation station serving a city from which a shoulder-launched SAM
had been launched simply to convince the other side not to launch additional missiles. In
the no-fly context, the relationship between that act and the goal of precluding the SAM
sites front engaging enforcement aircraft is too attenuated.
67. Though the United States is not a Party to the agreement, Additional Protocol I
contains two proportionality provisions, both of which the United States characterizes as
declaratory of customary international law. Article 51(5) provides that "an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to ci-
vilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated" is disallowed as indiscriminate. Article
57(2) (b) requires an attack to be canceled or suspended if "it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, arts. 51(5) &
57(2)(b) respectively. For a summary of Protocol I and the U.S. position on key articles,
see INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONS LAW DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAW DEPLOYMENT
DESKBOOK, tab 12 (n.d.). An unofficial article often cited as accurately setting forth the
U.S. position is Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Rela-
tion of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 A.M. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 419 (1987).
68. The area (measured in range and altitude) in which targets can be effectively en-
gaged and destroyed.
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presence of military aircraft, it would be disproportionate to de-
stroy a military aircraft with no offensive capability transporting
civilians across the zone. Military (actually political advantage
sought by the mandate) advantage is outweighed by the incidental
injury. The proper remedy in this case is to clarify the require-
ments; at minimum, parties should be warned that further viola-
tions will be dealt with by force.
69
Both these principles must be factored in as the mandate is
translated into rules of engagement. The only exception to their
applicability occurs when the mandate itself authorizes acts which
would otherwise be unnecessary or disproportionate. After all, the
Security Council resolution on which the authority for the zone is
based has actual legal valence; the ROE merely interpret the man-
date. As an example, the Security Council could authorize an at-
tack on civil aircraft of no military value to the target State or
threat to enforcement aircraft (necessity), even if civilian casualties
(proportionality) would ensue, simply by implicitly or explicitly in-
cluding them in its mandate.
To justify this departure from the traditional law of armed
conflict, it must be understood that Chapter VII permits what
would otherwise be in violation of the law if performed by States
acting without Council sanction.70 Article 39 allows the Security
Council to conduct a balancing test between whatever enforce-
ment actions it deems necessary and the threat to which they re-
spond. Moreover, the Charter, a treaty based in the original con-
sent of the Parties, is generally controlling over existing customary
69. The advantage calculation would shift if such violations occurred because the
overall effectiveness of the zone would diminish. Thus, even under the principle of pro-
portionality, downing subsequent similar violators following adequate warning might be
justifiable.
70. As noted in the Nuclear Weapons case,
[The] prohibition of the use of force is to be considered in the light of other rele-
vant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the inher-
ent right of individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs. A further lawful
use of force is envisaged in Article 42, whereby the Security Council may take
military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter.
International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General
List No. 95, July 8,1996, 41, 35 I.L.M. 814 (1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. This
point must not be carried to an extreme, for the Court was speaking to the issue of the re-
sort to force, vice methods used to employ force. On the case, see Michael N. Schmitt,
The International Court of Justice and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 7 USAFA J. LEG. STU.
57 (1997) (and NAV. WAR C. REV., Spring 1998, at 91).
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law;71 as to treaty law, Article 103 provides for the supremacy of
Charter obligations.
72
It can be argued that in certain extreme cases, such as direct
enforcement against civilian objects or personnel, the prohibition
on targeting them is more than customary international law; it has
become jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law which
admits of no deviation.73 The very existence of jus cogens norms is
71. The listing of sources found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice is generally recognized as being set forth in priority order. It provides:
1. The Court... shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the consenting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
993,3 Bevans 1179.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. The International Court of Justice has in fact noted the
primacy of Security Council actions. In the Lockerbie case, the Court declined to indicate
provisional measures requested by Libya on the basis that Charter obligations prevail over
those in other agreements such as the Montreal Convention. The Charter obligations
were contained in Resolution 748 (1992), which cited Chapter VII as its basis. The hold-
ing of the Court illustrates the degree to which Council actions are determinative:
Whereas both Libya and the United States, as Members of the United Nations,
are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in ac-
cordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the Court, which is at the stage
of proceedings on provisional measures, considers that prima facie this obliga-
tion extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in
accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that
respect prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement,
including the Montreal Convention ....
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J., 39, 31 I.L.M. 662
(1992). In The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defense Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 31, Oct. 2, 1995, 31 I.L.M. 32 (1996), the
court rejected claims that the Security Council establishment of the Tribunal based on
Chapter VII of the Charter was inappropriate. In particular, it stated that "the Security
Council has a broad discretion in deciding on the course of action and evaluating the ap-
propriateness of the measures to be taken." It declined even to consider the question of
legality.
73. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the norm, using the la-
bel "peremptory," as follows:
Art. 53. A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
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controversial however.74 Any action pursuant to a Chapter VII de-
termination by the Security Council that the measure will contrib-
ute to the maintenance of international peace and security would
be unlikely to fall as violative of jus cogens.
Theory aside, in cases of even questionable uses of force, law
quickly fades before policy. A policy decision will have to be
made regarding whether or not traditional jus in bello prescriptive
norms will yield to a weightier policy interest effectuated via
Chapter VII. The decision may well turn on a balancing of poten-
tial harm to enforcement against likely international condemna-
tion. For obvious reasons, an act violating the traditional jus in
bello normative paradigm should only be approved in the most ex-
treme circumstances.
From a technical point of view, it must be understood that
both necessity and proportionality are principles of the law of
armed conflict, a body of law which only applies in international,
as distinct from non-international, armed conflict. 75 No-fly zones
may or may not take place in a state of international armed con-
flict. Fortunately, the difficulty of drawing the complicated legal
distinction between international and non-international armed
conflict is eased by the policy decision of many States to have their
forces apply the law of armed conflict irrespective of the charac-
terization of the conflict absent instructions otherwise. 76 There-
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a sub-
sequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). It should be noted that Article 64 of the Conven-
tion provides that "if a new peremptory norm of general international law of the kind re-
ferred to in Article 53 emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm be-
comes void and terminates." Id. art. 64.
74. The entire issue of jus cogens norms is controversial. Indeed, in North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4, 42, the International Court of Justice noted that it was not "at-
tempting to enter into, still less pronounce on any question of jus cogens." In fact, there
have been no cases in which a treaty provision, or implementation thereof, has been de-
termined violative of a jus cogens norm. For conflicting views on the existence of jus co-
gens norms, see LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988) and JERZY SZTUCKI,
JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (1974).
75. On the distinction between international and non-international armed conflict,
see GREEN, supra note 6, at 52-66; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 815-821
(4th ed. 1997).
76. The SROE guidance on the subject is as follows:
U.S. forces will always comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. Not all situa-
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fore, as a matter of policy, if not law, execution of no fly zone
ROE must generally comport with these principles.
The centrality of legal norms in ROE should by now be ap-
parent. Although ROE can never address every possible legal is-
sue that might arise (lest they be so complex as to be rendered
completely incomprehensible), effective ROE will cover those
most likely to arise in the context of a particular operation, as well
as those most difficult to analyze in the split-second decision-
making that characterizes aerial operations. It is also important to
understand that although the legal aspects of ROE tend to be seen
as restrictive, law also allows ROE to act as force enablers.77 This
is most true in the case of self-defense. Recognition that the use of
force is always an act of national policy causes some flyers to hesi-
tate to use force, even when reasonable to defend themselves,
their troops or other appropriate assets.78  An understanding of
tions involving the use of force, however, are armed conflicts under international
law. Those approving operational rules of engagement must determine if the in-
ternationally recognized Law of Armed Conflict applies. In those circumstances
when armed conflict, under international law, does not exist, Law of Armed
Conflict principles may nevertheless be applied as a matter of national policy. If
armed conflict occurs, the actions of U.S. forces will be governed by both the
Law of Armed Conflict and rules of engagement.
SROE, supra note 4, at A-2 to A-3. The UN position is that the Law of Armed Conflict as
articulated in the primary conventions (1949 Geneva Conventions, Protocols Additional,
and the Cultural Property Convention) should apply in all peace operations. Draft Model
Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and
Equipment to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary
General (May 23, 1991), U.N. Doc. A/46/185, reprinted in UN PEACE OPERATIONS (Wal-
ter G. Sharp ed., 1995). The difficulty of determining the status of an armed conflict is il-
lustrated by the case of the former Yugoslavia. Seemingly contradictory conclusions on
the subject have been reached by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. Cf Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdomovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, Oct. 7, 1997 (finding an international conflict vis-A-vis the Bosnian Croats) with
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997. On
these cases, see Leslie C. Green, Erdemovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and Early
Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal (unpublished manuscript on file with
author, forthcoming in LESLIE C. GREEN, FURTHER ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF
WAR, Transnational Pub.).
77. As has been pointed out by others, ROE can also be viewed as a crisis manage-
ment tool for commanders that allows them, when unable to be present personally, to ex-
ercise positive control over their forces during stressful situations. Viewed thusly, ROE
do not so much limit a commander's courses of action, as they frame them. For an exam-
ple on point, see Douglas C. Palmer, Rules of Engagement as an Operational Tool 1-3
(Feb. 22, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file at NWC library).
78. There is evidence that fear of prosecution in the event the ROE are violated has
also contributed to hesitation to act in self-defense. In February 1993, Army Specialist
James Mowris and his platoon were on patrol in a Somali village when they saw two men
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the international law basis for the ROE can help counter this dan-
gerous propensity.
The third component of effective rules of engagement-com-
plementing policy and law-is operational soundness. ROE may
comport with policy and fall within the limits of the law, but if they
do not make sense from the perspective of the pilot in the cockpit,
they are unacceptable. As an example, consider a no-fly zone in
which there have been multiple incidents of intruder aircraft
launching missiles at enforcement aircraft. A rule of engagement
that would require a violator to be visually identified (VID) by en-
forcing aircraft, an act only possible at a distance well within the
violator's weapons engagement zone (WEZ), would be foolish at
best, possibly suicidal. Combat capable violators must be engaged
beyond visual range (BVR) if the zone is to be enforced safely. Of
course, fairly complex identification ROE (or guidance on the
rules issued by the commander) will need to be developed to guard
against mistaken engagements.
This example illustrates the point made earlier that the three
bases of ROE operate in tandem and synergistically. The principle
of distinction in international law79 requires a degree of pre-
engagement certainty that helps prevent mistaken downings likely
to undermine policy objectives. At the same time, and as will be
discussed more fully below, the law of self-defense allows en-
forcement aircraft to take whatever actions are tactically prudent
to defend themselves and others should a situation not specifically
accounted for in the ROE arise. The default right of self-defense
permits ROE driven by policy and law to remain operationally
running in an adjacent military area that was abandoned. Mowris chased them and, by his
account, fired a warning shot into the ground to convince them to stop. One of the Soma-
lis was killed. Mowris was subsequently convicted of negligent homicide in a trial that
suggested the ROE on the use of force were poorly understood by the soldiers. The court-
martial convening authority subsequently decided to set aside the conviction. Mark S.
Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143
MIL. L. REV. 1, 17, 66 (1994). Apparently, one consequence of the prosecution was that
soldiers in Somalia "were reluctant to fire even when fired upon for fear of legal action. It
took weeks to work through this .... There is no doubt that this case had a major effect
on the theatre." Letter from Colonel Wade H. McManus, Jr., Commander, Division Sup-
port Command, to Major General Guy A.J. LaBoa, Subject: Specialist James D. Mowris
(Sept. 28, 1993), reprinted in I Record of Trial, U.S. v. Mowris, GCM No. 68 (Fort Carson
& 4th Inf. Div., July 1, 1993). Id. at 66.
79. The principle requires belligerents to distinguish between valid military targets
and civilians and civilian objects. It is codified in Protocol I Additional, supra note 4, art.
51(4)-(5).
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credible to those who might contest the zone. Credibility gives rise
to the deterrent effect the declaration of the no-fly zone was in-
tended to achieve in the first place.80
A healthy focus on the bases of ROE will also act to identify
defective rules of engagement. 81 Only rules responsive to all three
are acceptable. Stated inversely, any rule of engagement that hin-
ders achievement of policy aims, is unlawful or is likely to result in
unlawful actions, or is operationally unsound must be rejected.
Understandably, then, ROE are best drafted by a team consisting
of a judge advocate and an operator, 82 and must be reviewed at an
appropriate policy level.
Mission Accomplishment and Self-Defense Rules. Rules of
engagement come in two varieties-mission accomplishment and
self-defense. Although it is critically important that this distinction
be recognized, the most common mistake made in drafting ROE is
the blurring of the two. When this occurs, the likelihood of inad-
vertently frustrating the mission or placing those who are tasked
with its execution at risk tends to be high.
Mission accomplishment rules are the easiest to understand
and execute for the operator but present the greatest challenge to
those responsible for drafting ROE. As the tether to the specific
policy objectives the no-fly zone is intended to achieve, they help
ensure that tactics and procedures used by enforcement aircraft
are lawful and operationally sound. Mission accomplishment rules
also allow the NCA the opportunity to provide direction on impor-
tant policy questions regarding the use of force not explicitly ad-
dressed in the initial political mandate.
80. Deterrence, properly understood, is the product of the will and capacity perceived
by the subject of the deterrent action.
81. The classic example of failure to adequately do so is the bombing of the Marine
Headquarters at Beirut International Airport in October 1983. In that case, the ROE
failed to account for an increase in the terrorist threat, as evidenced by the earlier bomb-
ing of the U.S. Embassy. Dep't of Defense, Report of the Commission on the Beirut In-
ternational Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Dec. 20, 1983); various lectures by
Professor Richard J. Grunawalt, Legal Counsel to the Commission, Naval War College,
1995-97.
82. In aerial operations, "operator" is a term of art for a flyer. It is absolutely essen-
tial that the judge advocate have a basic understanding of operational concepts and weap-
ons system capabilities. For a survey of these matters, see Robert A. Coe & Michael N.
Schmitt, Fighter Ops for Shoe Clerks, 42 A.F.L. REV. 49 (1997).
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It is here that the actual rules for enforcing the zone are set
forth. Unlike self-defense rules, mission accomplishment rules are
operation specific. They do not apply outside the context of a par-
ticular no fly zone enforcement effort. Reduced to basics, mission
accomplishment ROE set forth who may do what to whom, and
how, when, and where that action may occur.
Mission accomplishment rules are difficult to develop because
of the need to ensure consistency with each of the three bases of
ROE. For the sake of illustration, consider a seemingly straight-
forward Security Council mandate which states that military air-
craft are not to fly in a set zone. What does the term "military air-
craft" mean? Is it limited to armed aircraft? Does it include
military helicopters? Military transport aircraft? Whose military
aircraft? What of civil aircraft contracted to carry military supplies
and personnel? Are civil aircraft conducting reconnaissance for
military purposes considered to be "military aircraft"? What
about military aircraft performing civilian functions, such as the
transport of officials involved in cease-fire negotiations? Does it
matter if military aircraft are transporting civilians because the
civil air transport system in the country has collapsed? 83 Are mili-
tary aircraft delivering relief supplies included in the ban? Are
military medical aircraft exempt?
The problem is that the political mandate directing enforce-
ment of the zone is likely to be very broadly drafted because of the
difficulty of Security Council agreement on minutiae, however im-
portant the details may be. The dynamics of consensus-building,
particularly in a multi-national environment, drive mandates to-
wards generalities. In some cases, even the no-fly mandate itself
must be inferred, as in the case of the Iraqi zones. Mission accom-
plishment ROE fill in the gaps for those in the cockpit who cannot
be expected to resolve policy and legal issues as they receive a ra-
dar return from an incoming violator. Therein lies the dilemma.
ROE drafters are expected to put policy and legal flesh on a skele-
ton that was not the product of their own labors and which may be
understood differently by the various States involved. In extreme
cases, this may result in differing, even conflicting, mission accom-
83. Recall, for instance, that Iraqi military helicopters penetrated the southern no-fly
zone over Iraq to pick up pilgrims returning from the Haj. With regard to the decision not
to engage the helicopters, DoD spokesman Kevin Bacon stated, "We are not prepared to
stop what appear to be small-scale and humanitarian operations." Iraqi Copters Cross No-
fly Zone, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 23, 1997, at A-19.
[Vol. 20:727
Clipped Wings
plishment ROE during a combined operation consisting of multi-
ple national contingents.
84
Self-defense rules of engagement are much easier to draft, but
pose far greater interpretive problems. While ROE governing the
use of force to accomplish the mission must be precise enough to
safeguard against exceeding the policy mandate, falling short of it,
or violating international law, self-defense rules are intentionally
drafted broadly in order to pass as much discretion to the operator
as possible. The burden of decision shifts from the drafter to the
cockpit; the desire is to avoid any possibility of a crew hesitating to
defend itself because the ROE are not directly on point. There-
fore, whereas mission accomplishment ROE should anticipate
scenarios, self-defense ROE should clarify standards.
For very practical reasons, self-defense ROE are at the heart
of no-fly zone enforcement. 85 Such zones are most likely in the
netherworld lying between armed conflict and peace, where it is
often unclear who is and who is not friendly. Moreover, they are
non-consensual in fact, if not by law. Even when technically con-
sensual, there will be powerful incentives to violate the no-fly
zone. If not, there would be little need for enforcement with com-
bat aircraft. What this means is that crews enforcing such zones
regularly fly into a highly dangerous environment armed with only
a contingent right to use force, i.e., contingent on whether the zone
has been violated or whether there is a need to act in self-defense.
Effective ROE will allow them to exercise the latter right, which is
the foundation of a State's willingness to engage in such opera-
tions, to the fullest extent permissible under international law.
There are four types of self-defense, each deriving its legal
basis from Article 51 of the Charter.86 On the macro level is na-
tional self-defense, the act of defending one's country and national
interests. Generally, national self-defense is accomplished by de-
claring forces "hostile," i.e., subject to attack sans plus. The mere
84. A "combined operation" is "[a]n operation conducted by forces of two or more
allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission." Joint Pub 1-02,
supra note 56, at 77.
85. For a superb discussion of the right to self-defense in international law, see
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENCE 175-308 (2d ed. 1994).
86. The hierarchy of self-defense is based in part on that set forth in the SROE.
SROE, supra note 4, at A-4-A-5. The SROE describe collective self-defense as a subset
of national self-defense, and individual self-defense as a lesser included form of unit self-
defense. It is probably more useful to think of them as separate entities that operate quite
differently in differing contexts.
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existence of hostile forces renders them targets. National self-
defense plays little role in no-fly self-defense ROE.
The second form of self-defense is individual self-defense-
the act of defending oneself. Complementing individual self-
defense is the third type, unit self-defense, an action taken to
defend other personnel or units of one's own military forces.
Finally, political authorities may extend a defensive umbrella to
other States or their military personnel. This collective self-
defense must be approved at the highest level-in the United
States, the NCA.87 Collective self-defense is an essential element
in a combined no-fly zone operation during which aircraft of a
particular nation typically perform set functions, such as
reconnaissance, relying on aircraft from another nation for
protection. Article 51 legitimizes this cooperative approach.
It is well established under international law that an act in
self-defense must be characterized by two elements-necessity and
proportionality. 88 Beyond that, each State defines the criteria un-
der which its forces may exercise self-defense. The United States
takes a relatively liberal view of the right. As used in the self-
defense rules of engagement, 89 necessity and proportionality differ
from the jus in bello principles of military necessity and propor-
tionality discussed earlier.90 Proportionality and necessity in the
context of self-defense ROE are about when force may be resorted
to. By contrast, in the jus in bello context, military necessity and
proportionality are basic principles regarding how force may be
used; they apply to both mission accomplishment and self-defense
ROE.
87. Id. at A-6.
88. This was made clear in the Nuclear Weapons case. There the International Court
of Justice stated:
The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law. As the
Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (L C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 94, 176): 'there is a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond
to it, a rule well-established in customary international law.' This dual condition
applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force em-
ployed.
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 70, at 41.
89. SROE, supra note 4, at A-6.
90. An act in self-defense must comport with both the elements of self-defense and
the jus in bello. Nuclear Weapons case, supra note 70, at 42.
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When used as an element of self-defense, necessity is defined
as a situation in which a "hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist
unit exhibits hostile intent." 91 "Hostile act" and "hostile intent"
are ROE terms of art. The cleanest basis for a use of force in self-
defense is in response to a hostile act. It is described as an:
[A]ttack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit
[organization or individual] against the United States, US
forces, and in certain circumstances, US citizens, their property,
US commercial assets, and other designated non-US forces,
foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used di-
rectly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US
forces, including the recovery of US personnel and vital US
Government property. When a hostile act is in progress, the
right exists to use proportional force, including armed force, in
self-defense by all necessary means available to deter or neu-
tralize the potential attacker or, if necessary, to destroy the
threat.
92
In the context of a no-fly zone, hostile act means that some-
one is shooting at you or at someone else involved in the enforce-
ment operation. As a matter of law and policy, the right to defend
oneself in the face of a hostile act is universally accepted.
It is with the concept of hostile intent that most difficulties
surface. For U.S. forces, hostile intent is:
[T]he threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or ter-
rorist unit, or organization against the United States and US na-
tional interests, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US
citizens, their property, US commercial assets, or other desig-
nated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property.
When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use propor-
tional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all neces-
sary means available to deter or neutralize the potential at-
tacker or, if necessary, to destroy the threat. A determination
that hostile intent exists and re quires the use of proportional
force in self-defense must be based on convincing evidence that
an attack is imminent. 93
Simplified, hostile intent means someone is about to shoot at
you or someone else involved in the enforcement operation. Un-
fortunately, the policy and legal underpinnings of ROE may seem
91. Id.
92. SROE, supra note 4, at GL-9.
93. lt
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to conflict with their operational basis when seeking to understand
self-defense ROE. Whereas the judge advocate and policy maker
want to insure no action is taken until the requisite threshold for
self-defense under Article 51 has been reached, the operator is
concerned about one thing-being shot down. These two very dif-
ferent cognitive paradigms can lead to confusion over the meaning
of self-defense ROE. The most common misunderstanding turns
on the distinction between "threaten" and "threat." The mere fact
that something is a threat to an enforcement aircraft does not
mean it has demonstrated hostile intent. It must first threaten the
aircraft, i.e., it must engage in an act that is hostile or evidence an
intent to commit a hostile action. The best way to think of the dis-
tinction is as the difference between a verb and a noun; because
the standard is one of intent, the actor, even though posing a
threat (noun), must act (verb) to suggest his intent in some way.
To illustrate, consider a combat aircraft flying at high speed
and altitude towards a no-fly zone line. Armed with long-range
air-to-air missiles, this "high-fast flyer" is a potent threat to en-
forcement aircraft, particularly non-fighters such as tankers. The
longer enforcement aircraft wait to engage it, the greater the
threat it poses and the more difficult it will be to counter if it
crosses the line. Yet, it has done nothing that suggests hostile in-
tent; it has threatened no one. Instead, the high-fast flyer has
merely flown within its own sovereign airspace, as it is clearly enti-
tled to do under international law. Unless it commits an act that in
some way reveals malevolent intent, it may not be engaged until it
has crossed the line, a point at which mission accomplishment
ROE intercede to govern the response. This is a difficult distinc-
tion to make for a crew member who must fly in the face of a
threat which has not yet threatened. 94
Even with definitional clarity, hostile intent is difficult to as-
certain in practice because it is both subjective and contextual. It
is subjective in the sense that unless there is reliable intelligence
information regarding the intent of the opposing forces, it is ex-
ceedingly difficult to determine intent until a hostile act actually
occurs. For instance, if a target State fighter approaching the no-
fly zone illuminates an enforcement aircraft with its fire control
94. Of course, ROE are always contextual. If a similar aircraft employing identical
tactics approached the no-fly-zone boundary the previous day and attacked an enforce-
ment aircraft, the threshold for engaging on this day would certainly be lower.
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radar ("locks on"), it may or may not be intending to take a missile
shot. Perhaps it only aims to frazzle enforcement aircrews, dem-
onstrate resolve against the operation, or desensitize enforcement
aircraft in order to catch them off-guard when it really does intend
to shoot. 95 Or perhaps it is about to launch a deadly air-to-air mis-
sile.
Each determination is also contextual. What is a demonstra-
tion of hostile intent in certain scenarios may not be in others.
Being locked-on in the Gulf of Sidra by a Libyan fighter, for ex-
ample, is far more likely to constitute hostile intent than being
locked-on in the Hudson Bay by Canadian aircraft. When assess-
ing context, the following factors are often telling:96
The current political context. What is the level of tension be-
tween the enforcing States and the State over whose territory the
zone has been established? Have there been any recent state-
ments or acts indicating the possibility of an attempt to test the re-
solve of the no-fly forces? Is there any reason to believe now
would be an opportune time to do so? For instance, have there
been any recent indications of cracks in the coalition enforcing the
zone or slippage in international support for it?97
Prior practice. Have there been prior violations and/or uses
of force against enforcement aircraft? In what circumstances? By
ground or airborne assets? What tactics were employed, and do
they resemble those the aircrew is observing now?
Indications and warning intelligence. Have there been any
deployments of threat systems that might suggest a greater capa-
bility or willingness to engage enforcement aircraft? For example,
have additional or more capable surface-to-air missile systems or
aircraft come into the area? Have SAMs been moved to as yet
undetermined locations, thereby raising the possibility of a "SAM-
bush"? 98 Has there been an increase in air-to-air training? Has
95. The MiG-25 downed by the SOUTHERN WATCH F-16 in December 1993 was
likely testing U.S. resolve to enforce the zone. Petersen, supra note 2, at 8; William Mat-
thews, Coverage ofiraqi No-fly Zone Increases, A.F. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 4.
96. The SROE cite four factors without amplification: 1) the state of interna-
tional/regional political tension; 2) military preparations; 3) intelligence; and 4) indications
and warning information. SROE, supra note 4, at GL-9.
97. This is likely to be the case, e.g., in the event of a mistaken enforcement action,
such as the Black Hawk shootdowns. Another example of a period posing such a risk was
during the Iraqi involvement in the Kurdish in-fighting, the shift from Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT to NORTHERN WATCH, and the resulting pullout of French forces.
98. A SAMbush occurs when a SAM system "ambushes" an enforcement aircraft.
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there been an unexplained stand-down (period of little or no fly-
ing) that might suggest preparation for an engagement? 99 Have
there been unusual movements of ground forces that indicate a
possible military action likely to be accompanied by air support?
Capabilities. Does the aircraft or missile system have the ca-
pability to engage at this distance or altitude? With what likeli-
hood of success? How much of a threat is the missile (or other
weapon) if the possible hostile intent matures into a hostile attack?
In other words, are the enforcement aircraft's defensive systems,
such as electronic-counter measures (ECM) or chaff and flare,
100
effective against this particular threat or can the enforcement air-
craft easily maneuver to "defeat" the threat? 1 1
The fact that the determination of hostile intent is subjective
and contextual renders it unwise to include a laundry list of acts
which amount to hostile intent in the ROE.10 2 If an act contained
on the list does not rise to the level of hostile intent given the cir-
cumstances in which it is occurring, and the aircrew nevertheless
reacts forcibly, the response may be characterized as a violation of
the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). After all, no act
justifying a response under Article 51 has occurred. The action
will, at very best, embarrass the enforcement State. More likely, it
will result in some form of international condemnation.
On the other hand, a laundry list may cause the aircrew to
hesitate to act in valid self-defense should they be faced with a
situation not previously contemplated. It is simply impossible to
reliably and comprehensibly predict those actions that are indica-
For example, a mobile SAM system could be placed in a hidden location near the no-fly
boundary. A "bait" aircraft might then fly quickly towards the line knowing this will cause
the enforcement aircraft to maneuver into a position to engage the potential violator that
is within range of the hidden SAM site. This is but one possible SAMbush scenario.
99. Stand-downs are used to prepare the aircraft, plan, and ensure adequate rest for
aircrews prior to combat.
100. Chaff consists of metallic filaments released by the aircraft to disrupt ground-
based radar by creating returns that effectively "cloud" it over. Flares are dropped to dis-
rupt heat-seeking missiles. See Coe & Schmitt, supra note 82, at 81.
101. If so, not only does this lower the likelihood of the act constituting hostile intent,
it allows the aircrew greater time to make the hostile intent determination.
102. That said, operators will typically look to the judge advocate to do so, pointing
out the difficulty of making a complex determination in the mere seconds available in the
cockpit. Self-defense being a legal standard, operators expect the judge advocate to de-
termine which acts meet it. The temptation to do so must be resisted, for such a list places
both national policy and aircrews at risk. The list will inevitably tend to be viewed as ex-
clusive.
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tive of hostile intent. That being so, ROE drafters should not at-
tempt to do so. The far better course is to rely on the pre-mission
self-defense training that aircrews receive to enable them to evalu-
ate events as they unfold.
This does not mean that rules of engagement should not in-
clude lists of acts that might suggest hostile intent. Most do exactly
that. For instance, in the no-fly environment, being locked on by a
fire control radar or having a potential opponent maneuver into a
position from which he can best engage enforcement aircraft are
classic examples of potentially hostile intent. The same is true
with regard to ground-based SAMs that lock on to enforcement
aircraft. Whenever such lists are included in ROE, however, it is
critically important to stress that they are only possible indicators
of hostile intent, neither exclusive nor determinative in nature.103
Hostile intent is not only difficult to define, it is difficult to
place temporally. Recall that the language of Article 51 speaks in
terms of an "armed attack." Yet, surely there is no requirement to
take the first hit before the right to self-defense arises.10 4 Given
today's effective weaponry, any such assertion would be absurd,
103. The SROE language is as follows:
Commanders should use all available information to determine hostile intent.
Intelligence, politico-military factors, and technological capabilities require a
commander to consider a wide range of criteria in determining the existence of
hostile intent. No list of indicators can substitute for the commander's judg-
ment. The following guidance is not meant to be a 'checklist' but rather exam-
ples which taken alone or in combination might lead a commander to determine
that a force is evidencing hostile intent. Among the actions that might lead to a
reasonable belief that hostile intent exists are ....
SROE, supra note 4, at A-B-1. Though this particular caveat is for seaborne forces, a
similarly worded proviso would be appropriate for aerial operations.
104. For a discussion of this issue, see George Bunn, International Law and the Use of
Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit? NAVAL WAR C. REV.,
May-June 1986, at 69. The concern that political pressure will require excessive risk-
taking is not new. During the Falklands Campaign, the Commander of the Falklands Bat-
tle Group was worried that "political requirements could result in our entering [the exclu-
sion zone around the Falklands declared by the British] with our hands tied behind our
backs. I thought it was all too possible that I was going to be told again, 'The enemy must
fire the first shot."' He was worried that his political masters would want the United
Kingdom to appear the "wronged party." SANDY WOODWARD, ONE HUNDRED DAYS:
THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER 108 (1992). Admiral
Woodward's concern appears well founded. In a joint U.S. Naval War College and UK
Royal Naval Staff College seminar held in October 1996, the British position was that
"UK ROE will normally accept the risk of first hit, i.e., do not fire unless fired on." Royal
Navy Staff College Background Paper, ROE. Political Tool or Military Nightmare? (un-
dated, n.p., on file with author).
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for taking the first hit in aerial combat is usually fatal. Most com-
mentators and practitioners agree that there is a right to anticipa-
tory self-defense, i.e., the right to act in self-defense before the
other side attacks. The question that confounds international law
is how anticipatory may the need for self-defense be?
10 5
The most widely accepted standard is that articulated by Sec-
retary of State Daniel Webster regarding the Caroline incident in
the nineteenth century. For Webster, self-defense was to "be con-
fined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."10 6 This standard was subsequently referred to ap-
provingly during the Nuremberg trials. 10 7 Today it is expressed as
the requirement of imminency.
But what is it that must be imminent? Imminency cannot
possibly be measured in terms of proximity to the actual attack, for
such a standard is not responsive to the rationale for the right to
self-defense, specifically the right not to have to sit idly by while a
fatal blow is delivered. The proper measure of imminency is that
point in time when the threatened act can be viably deterred or de-
feated. In other words, one may not act in self-defense until the
moment when failing to do so may be too late. This fine distinc-
tion is of critical importance in aerial operations because of the fi-
nality and speed of the hostile act that follows a demonstration of
hostile intent. 108
105. Professor Dinstein adopts the terminology "interceptive" self-defense. It occurs
after the other side has "committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable
way." He argues that interceptive self-defense is consistent with Article 51. DINSTEIN,
supra note 85, at 190.
106. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411,412 (emphasis added). The
Caroline incident involved a Canadian insurrection in 1837. After being defeated, the in-
surgents retreated into the United States where they recruited and planned further opera-
tions. The Caroline was being used by the rebels. British troops crossed the border and
destroyed the Caroline by setting fire to the vessel and sending her over Niagara Falls.
Britain justified the action on the grounds that the United States was not enforcing its laws
along the frontier and that the action was a legitimate exercise of self-defense. 2 DIGEST,
supra, at 409-11.
107. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentence, 41 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 172, 205 (1947). The German leaders tried to justify the invasion of Norway as
self-defense against an anticipated British attack from Norway.
108. Along these same lines, it is occasionally asked whether an aircraft must "call
home" to seek authority to act in self-defense. The SROE do require that the threatened
aircraft call home if time permits. If there is time, however, to radio to the air operations
center (AOC) for instructions, usually the threat is not imminent. The crew may seek
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Self-defense not only has a start point, it has an end point as
well. Recall the requirement that self-defense be a response to a
threatening or hostile act. When that act ends, i.e., when there is
no longer an ongoing hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent
to respond to, the enforcement aircraft may not persist in engaging
in self-defense. This is colloquially known as the "once it's over,
it's over" rule.10 9 It is replete with practical implications for no-fly
zone operations. Most significantly, if an aircraft is acting in self-
defense against another aircraft, and that aircraft clearly and un-
ambiguously breaks off the engagement, then the attacked aircraft
has no right under self-defense to continue the fight.110 It too must
break off (absent a mission accomplishment rule to the contrary).
This may seem contrary to good sense,"' which would suggest that
the aircraft which committed the hostile act remains a threat by
definition. So it, in fact, does; however, recall that self-defense
only grants a legal right to respond to threatening acts, not mere
threats (no matter how potent).
What if the action of the enforcement aircraft defeats the
threat before it is engaged? For example, assume an enforcement
aircraft is illuminated by the fire control radar of a SAM site. This
would in many cases constitute a demonstration of hostile intent
and permit an immediate attack on the site. The threatened air-
craft's most prudent course of action, however, would usually be to
maneuver to evade the missile if fired and depart the SAM's
weapons engagement zone. This is so because a quick, immediate
response to a SAM site with whatever ordnance happens to be
available is a dangerous proposition; SAMs are specifically de-
general guidance (or even authority to engage under the mission accomplishment rules),
but in most cases it may not engage in self-defense until there is no longer time to call
home-until the need is "instant and overwhelming." Simply put, the imminency re-
quirement is that an enforcement aircraft may not act in self-defense until it has to, but it
need not necessarily wait until the hostile intent is about to become a hostile act.
109. Of course, though the right to self-defense is no longer operative, it cannot be
overemphasized that mission accomplishment ROE may provide a separate and distinct
authorization to engage.
110. Note that a "clear and unambiguous" breaking off of the engagement will be diffi-
cult to discern. Therefore, it is tactically sound and legally acceptable to continue the fight
until convinced it is over.
111. It would also appear to conflict with the general approach to surrender of aircraft
during armed conflict, i.e., that capitulation is seldom accepted in aerial combat because of
the difficulty of verifying true status. DEP'T. OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (AFP 110-31), 4-
2d (1976).
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signed to shoot down aircraft. The alternative, and often better,
approach tends to be a measured sequential attack on the site by
aircraft carrying anti-radiation missiles, followed by those em-
ploying either cluster bomb units or "iron" bombs.11 2 May the air-
craft withdraw and take time to coordinate such an attack?
No it may not, at least not pursuant to the self-defense rules of
engagement. Once there are no aircraft within the SAM's weap-
ons engagement zone (WEZ), there is no present threatening act
to defend against. This poses a Catch-22 dilemma for no-fly-zone
enforcement. An aircraft that is illuminated is at immediate risk
and generally should maneuver out of the WEZ as quickly as pos-
sible. Once it does, however, international law intervenes to deny
the aircraft or its fellow aircraft the right to subsequently attack
the site in self defense. The quandary is obvious. The State
against whom the no-fly zone is applied could easily frustrate en-
forcement by simply illuminating enforcement aircraft, thereby
forcing enforcement aircraft into the Hobson's choice of breaking
off the overall mission as planned or attacking under less than op-
timal circumstances.
11 3
112. Such missions are labeled SEAD-suppression of enemy air defenses. When the
sites are actually destroyed, vice simply suppressed for a period sufficient to allow friendly
aircraft to transit the area, SEAD is sometimes labeled DEAD-destruction of enemy air
defenses. See Coe & Schmitt, supra note 82, at 53. It is important to understand that tac-
tics are situation specific. If the aircraft being threatened is armed with a HARM, a mis-
sile specifically designed to home in on a target's radar emission (and thus very useful
against SAM sites), then the best course of action may well be to attack immediately. For
this reason, it may be prudent to send a HARM "shooter" into the WEZ first to deter-
mine whether the SAM site is likely to act aggressively. Descriptions of air-to-ground
weapons are found in id. at 67-70.
113. This is a particular problem for reconnaissance missions. No-fly zone or associ-
ated operations generally have a reconnaissance component to allow the task force to re-
main apprised of the threat to enforcement aircraft. Unfortunately, tactical reconnais-
sance aircraft usually must fly within the WEZ of the site it is imaging to secure photos
that are of sufficient clarity for use in identifying threats. Thus, such aircraft cannot simply
fly around or above ground-based threat systems.
It should be pointed out, in this regard, that the U.S. definition of self-defense does allow a
reaction to hostile acts intended to impede the mission. Illumination with fire control ra-
dar, however, is a demonstration of hostile intent, not a hostile act, and the hostile intent
provision does not extend to impeding mission accomplishment. Moreover, as a matter of
international law vice national policy, acting in response to an effort to impede the mission
is more an act of self-help than of self-defense, though the use of force as a means of self-
help under the Charter regime is controversial. See VON GHLAHN, supra note 6, at 633-
62. On self-help in a peacetime context, see Corfu Channel, supra note 49.
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A remedy is to be found in mission accomplishment ROE.
By definition, the original mandate called for the enforcement of a
no-fly zone, but it is unlikely to include many specific restrictions
on this tasking. The zone cannot be enforced effectively if ground-
based defenses are permitted to force enforcement aircraft to alter
planned missions simply by turning on their radar systems.
114
Therefore, the authority to enforce the zone necessarily implies
corresponding authority to take whatever reasonable steps are
called for to do so safely; this authority would logically include the
right to destroy SAM sites that have already demonstrated hostile
intentions and are, thereby, frustrating overall accomplishment of
the mandate. The proper method for articulating the right is
through mission accomplishment ROE, not an overly expansive
view of the legal right of self-defense.
Reasonableness is the key. One might argue that it would be
even more prudent to take out all SAM sites with an ability to
reach enforcement aircraft, regardless of whether or not they had
committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Absent
specific authority in the mandate, doing so as part of the no-fly op-
eration without any incidents of interference with operations
would likely be judged to be beyond either the Charter-based use
of force authorization of the mandate or the Article 51/customary
international law right of self-defense. Reasonableness requires
that issuance of the mission accomplishment rule result from evi-
dence that activities at the site(s) have moved it along the contin-
uum from a mere threat towards a target which has acted in a
threatening manner. Having just demonstrated hostile intent or
committed a hostile act would clearly meet the threshold.
In such cases, the temporal element surfaces again. The
longer it has been since the qualifying action, the more difficult it
will be to justify an after the fact air strike against the offending
site(s) as an appropriate exercise of the mandate. This is particu-
larly so if at some point following the incident, aircraft flying in the
area were not threatened; the absence of reaction might indicate
114. This possibly became somewhat of a reality in Operation DENY FLIGHT. NATO
commanders wanted to attack SAM sites in Bosnia-Herzegovina that threatened enforce-
ment aircraft. The UN disapproved the proposal out of fear that the action might result in
retaliation against UNPROFOR troops on the ground. As a result, NATO aircraft en-
forcing the ban were required to fly outside the WEZs of known sites. Steven Watkins,
Does Deny Flight Still Work? A.F. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at 3. In this case, operational
concerns gave way in the face of greater UN policy implementation.
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that the initial malevolent act was an aberration. Since interna-
tional law does not permit acts in mere retribution (at least absent
specific Chapter Vll authorization), a strike may be questioned on
legal grounds. Therefore, prudent ROE drafters will limit the ex-
tent of the authorization to restrike, recalling the policy compo-
nent of ROE, to a level at minimum consistent with the relative
political fragility of the particular operation. This can be done by
setting time standards (e.g., no strike more than X hours after the
incident) or by physical criteria (e.g., strike only with aircraft cur-
rently airborne or on strip alert).
Finally, it is vital to remember that hostile intent and hostile
acts are merely shorthand for the necessity requirement of self-
defense. In fact, necessity is slightly more restrictive than either
intent or act, for there are situations in which it is not necessary to
engage, even when a hostile act has been committed. Consider an
individual firing a pistol out the door of a helicopter at a fighter
trailing it out of the zone. In most cases, the weapon poses little
threat to the fighter, which can easily lengthen the dis-
tance/altitude from which it is trailing the helicopter. Unless the
mission accomplishment ROE allow a forceful response based on
the act, there is ample time to seek guidance before resorting to
force. Remember, the use of force in self-defense has no retribu-
tive or deterrent purpose; it merely serves to protect one's self and
one's unit. There is no authority to engage under the law of self-
defense until friendly forces actually need to be protected. 115
The second prong of self-defense is proportionality. Propor-
tionality is defined as the requirement that "the use of force be
reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on all the
facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter
the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety
of U.S. forces." 116 Several fine points about this definition merit
mention. One is the pervasive question of proportional to what?
Many laymen interpret the requirement as "proportional" to the
force used against them. By this interpretation, one could not re-
spond to small arms ground fire with bombs or use a missile to
down a helicopter that has employed machine guns against an air-
115. One must be careful about black and white characterizations of lawfulness. The
determination of actual necessity will be made in the cockpit based on the aircrew's sub-
jective judgment.
116. SROE, supra note 4, at A-5.
[Vol. 20:727
Clipped Wings
craft. This is clearly not the proper reading. The right to use self-
defense is designed to protect without unnecessarily escalating the
hostilities; it is not a rule designed to ensure a "fair fight" on a
level playing field.
Properly understood, proportionality as used in the ROE al-
lows the application of no more force than necessary to counter
the hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.117 Aircrews train
to the standard of using the minimum force necessary to get the
other side to "knock it off," without taking unnecessary risks
themselves. For instance, a missile launch by a single SAM site
would not merit a response in self-defense against other SAM sites
in a country-at least not in self-defense. 118 Similarly, consider a
combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort. A column of soldiers
moving towards a downed crew member likely harbors hostile in-
tent if the aircraft was shot down by its forces. The troops would
reasonably appear to be on their way to capture the crew member.
The existence of necessity is clear, for the opposing forces are un-
likely to be deterred except by force (or a demonstration thereof),
and the threat is imminent (they are approaching). May the col-
umn be attacked and destroyed? Recalling that a no-fly operation
is underway rather than open hostilities, answer is-it depends. If
the column can be deterred by warning shots or selective destruc-
tion of only a few of the vehicles without forfeiting the ability to
destroy it in its entirety, that should be tried. On the other hand, if
it is nearly upon the pilot or shooting at him, destruction of the en-
tire column would clearly be an appropriate response. 119
What then of the situation where the armament of the en-
forcement aircraft clearly exceeds the amount of force actually
necessary to cause the other side to cease its threatening act? May
117. For instance, the IFOR (ground) ROE guidelines on opening fire provided, "You
may only open fire against a person if he/she is committing or about to commit an act
likely to endanger life and there is no other way to stop the hostile act" (emphasis in origi-
nal). Force Commander's Policy Directive Number 13, Rules of Engagement, Part 1:
Ground Forces, July 19, 1993, reprinted in Bruce D. Berkowitz, Rules of Engagement for
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Bosnia, ORBIS, Fall 1994, at 635, 643.
118. This does not mean that an attack on the country's air defense system would be
illegal. It simply means that it would not be justifiable under the principle of self-defense.
This point emphasizes the fact that actions during no-fly operations, other than in self-
defense, are essentially political in nature.
119. Care must be taken not to read this principle too liberally. It is not a justification
for risking the downed survivor. Uncertainty should always be resolved in favor of pro-
tecting the crew member or other assets involved in the CSAR effort.
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it be used? Yes, because the law does not deprive an aircraft un-
der attack of the right to defend itself pursuant to Article 51
merely because the mission planners did not fully anticipate the
nature of the threat when determining the weapons load. The U.S.
ROE account for this very situation by specifically authorizing a
response by "all necessary means available."120 Consistent with
the law of self-defense, then, an enforcement aircraft may use the
amount and type of force currently available to it that is reasonably
necessary to deter a demonstration of hostile intent or defend
against a hostile act.
As should be clear from the discussion of necessity and pro-
portionality, determining when self-defense is appropriate is no
easy task, particularly in the heat of potential battle. Enforcement
aircrews can only make subjective educated guesses based on the
information at hand. That information must be "convincing,"' 121
but the resulting determination need not be correct, it need only
be reasonable-i.e., would a reasonable airman enforcing this spe-
cific no-fly zone in the circumstances then prevailing have believed
the information sufficient to conclude an attack was forthcom-
ing? 122 Constant scenario-based training is the key to achieving
.reasonableness.123
Before turning from the distinction between mission accom-
plishment and self-defense ROE, it must be understood that they
are independent; neither limits the other. An action authorized in
accordance with the mission accomplishment ROE is not disal-
lowed because it fails to meet the criteria for self-defense. Thus,
hostile intent and hostile act are generally not relevant when act-
ing pursuant to the mission accomplishment ROE. By the same
token, and more importantly, self-defense ROE are never limited
by mission accomplishment ROE. If the two should ever come
into conflict, self-defense always "trumps" mission accomplish-
120. SROE, supra note 4, at A-5.
121. Id. at GL-10.
122. See. e.g., The Hostage Case (U.S. v. List), 11 T.W.C. 759 (1950) (acquitting general
who had ordered destruction during German evacuation of Norway on basis that destruc-
tion was necessary due to general's mistaken belief that Soviets were pursuing his forces).
For an example of such an evaluation in the context of state-sponsored assassination, see
Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L. L. 609, 648-650 (1992).
123. For an excellent article on ground forces ROE and training, which contains many
principles that can be applied to the aerial environment by analogy, see Martin, supra note
78.
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ment rules. 124 This is a core principle of the U.S. approach to rules
of engagement, one that is so central that U.S. forces are not per-
mitted to operate under multinational rules of engagement incon-
sistent with U.S. notions of self-defense.
125
This absolute severability of the two genre of ROE has im-
portant implications in no-fly zone enforcement. For example,
mission accomplishment ROE will usually impose very stringent
identification requirements before a zone violator may be en-
gaged. The goal is to preclude mistakes such as those made during
the Black Hawks shoot-down incident. If the violator, however,
124. The SROE includes the following provision repeatedly throughout the document:
"These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all nec-
essary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the com-
mander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity." See e.g., SROE, supra note 4, at A-3.
125. The relevant provisions of the SROE are as follows:
(1) U.S. forces assigned to the OPCON [operational control] of a multinational
force will follow the ROE of the multinational force unless otherwise directed
by the NCA. US forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a multinational
force only if the combatant commander and higher authority determine that the
ROE for that multinational force are consistent with the policy guidance on unit
self-defense and with the rules for individual self-defense contained in this
document.
(2) When U.S. forces, under US OPCON, operate in conjunction with a multi-
national force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such
ROE cannot be established, U.S. forces will exercise the right and obligation of
self-defense contained in this document while seeking guidance from the appro-
priate combatant command. To avoid mutual interference, the multinational
force will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the operation of the U.S.
forces' intentions to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit self-
defense.
Id. at A-1. The need to seek common ROE extends beyond multinational concerns to the
consistency of ROE as between U.S. forces. On at least two occasions, different sets of
ROE applicable to U.S. forces have not been consistent. During operations in Somalia in
1994, there was a point at which U.S. snipers had more restrictive ROE than those as-
signed to UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia II). This was the result of
an incident in which a U.S. sniper acting in compliance with the ROE killed a Somali in
the back of a truck armed with a crew-served weapon that was approaching a U.S. com-
pound. Soon thereafter, Somalis appeared charging that he had shot a pregnant woman.
In the ensuing brouhaha, the U.S. JTF changed its rules on snipers, while UNOSOM did
not. See F.M. Lorenz, Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were they Effective? 42 NAVAL
L. REV. 62, 69-72 (1995). The second incident occurred during Operation JoINT
ENDEAVOR. When the operation commenced, some U.S. forces involved were assigned
to IFOR, while others were not. The former applied NATO ROE; non-IFOR troops were
governed by U.S. ROE, including the SROE. NATO ROE were eventually made appli-
cable to all U.S. forces in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Letter from Headquarters,
European Command to Commandant [sic], Naval War College, Subj: Lessons Learned
from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, June 28, 1996, USAFE/JA Joint Universal Lessons
Learned (JULL) (n.p.) (on file with author).
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commits a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent in a situation
necessitating an immediate response, it may be engaged in self-
defense regardless of whether or not it has been identified to the
level provided for in the mission accomplishment ROE. Similarly,
if the mission accomplishment ROE permit, a violator may be en-
gaged even when it has neither committed a hostile act nor dem-
onstrated hostile intent.
THE ROE SYSTEM
ROE systems differ from State to State, with the exception
that each country usually issues some form of broad ROE that es-
tablish overarching national rules. These are supplemented for
specific operations. Whenever serving in a combined operation,
the need to understand a coalition partner's ROE system is self-
evident, particularly if a set of common ROE cannot be agreed
upon. When this occurs, it will be left to the Coalition Com-
mander and the senior officers from each nation contributing
forces to develop tactical guidance that accounts for their respec-
tive ROE differences in a way that plays to the strengths in each
country's rules.
The U.S. system is relatively straight forward. At the pinna-
cle are the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement
(SROE). 126 Promulgated in 1994, the SROE set forth general
rules of engagement which govern the use of force by the U.S.
military during both peacetime and armed conflict (absent a spe-
cific exemption). 127 They consist of a Chairman's Instruction,
which introduces the rules, and four enclosures: A-Standing Rules
of Engagement for U.S. Forces; B-Supplemental Measures;
126. SROE, supra note 4. On the SROE generally, see Grunawalt, supra note 4.
127. The previous rules primarily governed operations during peacetime. The decision
was made that this approach had the potential for creating confusion in the transition from
peace to war. Therefore, the current iteration was designed to apply regardless of the
state of conflict. The 1988 Peacetime Rules of Engagement were promulgated by Memo-
randum from Secretary of the Joint Staff for Unified and Specified Combatant Command-
ers and Commander U.S. Element, NORAD, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for U.S.
Forces (Oct. 28, 1988) (on file with Oceans Law and Policy Dep't, Naval War College).
The current ROE provide: "These ROE apply to U.S. forces during all military opera-
tions and contingencies. Except as augmented by supplemental ROE for specific opera-
tions, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established herein remain in effect
until rescinded." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01), CJCS
Cover Letter (the Instruction itself), Oct. 1, 1994, at 3. The SROE do not apply when
military forces are assisting federal and local authorities during a civil disturbance or disas-
ter. Id. at A-2.
[Vol. 20:727
Clipped Wings
C-Compendium and Combatant Commander's Special ROE; and
D-References.
Enclosure A contains the basic rules of engagement that ap-
ply in all operations, including those involving no-fly zone en-
forcement, and at all times. No further authorization is needed for
their execution by aircraft enforcing a zone. 28 The enclosure de-
scribes the purpose, scope and policies underlying the rules. More
importantly, Enclosure A contains the self-defense rules of en-
gagement. Appendices for Seaborne Forces, Air Operations, and
Land Operations are attached. When issues of self-defense in the
no-fly environment arise, it is to Enclosure A that reference should
be made. 1
29
Supplemental measures, grouped into appendices for general
measures, maritime, air, and land operations, are found in Enclo-
sure B. It is essentially a catalogue of draft rules of engagement
that decision makers at the appropriate level can turn to in crafting
mission accomplishment rules to support a particular operation.
For example, possible measures such as the authority to pursue
aircraft across designated borders, defend designated non-U.S. as-
sets, or conduct reconnaissance are included. The authorization
level for the supplementals varies depending on the nature of the
rule sought.
Enclosure C contains a compendium of guidance on the
ROE. It also gathers standing rules of engagement issued by the
U.S. Combatant Commands to complement the SROE for the
area or function the combatant command controls.130 In a no-fly
128. Unless, of course, there are combined rules of engagement for the particular op-
eration with which all contributing States must comply. In such cases, the combined op-
eration's rules supplant the SROE for the purposes of that operation. As noted above,
though, the U.S. will not be bound by such rules unless they are consistent with the U.S.
position on self-defense.
129. Though much of the enclosure is classified, the first eight pages contain general
information on self-defense that is not. This section can be used as a strawman for the de-
velopment of coalition self-defense ROE.
130. The Combatant Commands are established in 10 U.S.C. 164. In layman's terms,
they are the broadest military organizations which employ combat forces. Combatant
commands report directly to the NCA (President and Secretary of Defense). They may be
organized either geographically or functionally. The five geographic commands are Atlan-
tic Command (primarily continental U.S.), European Command, Pacific Command, Cen-
tral Command (Middle East), and Southern Command (Latin America). The functional
commands are Strategic Command, Transportation Command, Special Operations Com-
mand, and Space Command. On command relationships, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified
Action Armed Forces (Joint Publication 0-2), Feb. 24,1995.
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zone operation, it is essential to understand both the SROE and
the standing ROE of that command which has authority over the
operation.131
Lastly, Enclosure D lists references and contains a glossary of
abbreviations, acronyms, terms and definitions. The glossary is
particularly useful in achieving common understanding of the
rules. For instance, some States do not allow the use of force in
the face of hostile intent as a measure in self-defense. Yet, opti-
mally, the threshold to cross prior to using force should be the
same for all assigned forces in a combined operation. To achieve
this commonality, non-U.S. armed forces that do not apply the in-
tent criterion would have to receive the equivalent of mission ac-
complishment ROE authorizing a response to hostile intent before
they could react as U.S. forces would under the SROE.
Sometimes the difference is more one of form than substance.
For instance, U.S. forces usually consider being illuminated by an
aircraft's fire control radar to be a demonstration of hostile intent
that may require a forceful response. Certain coalition allies, on
the other hand, may characterize the illumination as a hostile act.
In practical terms, the ROE are consistent. The glossary can pro-
vide a useful tool for seeking common ground between differing
national terminology. Conversely, it can be used to identify sub-
stantive variance when the same or similar terms are used.
132
As noted, combatant commands issue supplemental measures
that are the operation-specific mission accomplishment rules of
engagement. Those selected are usually activated in an Operation
Order outlining execution of the operation. 133 They may also be
requested by any subordinate commander (usually a Joint Task
Force [JTF] commander) tasked with enforcing the no-fly zone.
This option is available throughout the course of the operation. If
the JTF commander comes to believe his ROE are flawed or insuf-
ficient to successfully execute the mission, he is obligated to seek
131. For instance, NORTHERN WATCH is a European Command operation, whereas
SOUTHERN WATCH falls under the control of Central Command. Only Central Com-
mand, Pacific Command, and Southern Command have issued ROE of their own.
132. Drawing on a naval example, some States define disabling fire as firing into the
rudder, whereas others define it as firing into the bridge. Similarly, warning shots at sea
are variously described as firing across the bow, firing into the funnel, and raking the
bridge.
133. The planning and execution process for U.S. military operations is described in
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOCTRINE FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS (Joint Pub. 5-0),
Apr. 23, 1995.
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whatever authority is necessary to remedy the shortfall. Should
Enclosure B not contain a suitable mission accomplishment rule to
meet his needs, he may draft and propose one of his own.
The need to revise the ROE during an operation is not un-
common. After all, the original rules were responsive to the politi-
cal and military environment existing at the time of issuance; how-
ever, the environment is in constant flux. For instance, additional
SAM systems or ones with greater capabilities may deploy into a
previously benign area. If so, it may be prudent to request more
robust ROE for air-to-ground strikes in order to ensure the new
SAMs do not interfere with the mission. Or consider identification
ROE, i.e., the rules regarding how intruders and/or threats are to
be identified, and with what surety. If the target State deploys
high performance fighter aircraft into an area where there had
previously been only helicopters or low performance aircraft, it
would be prudent to develop beyond visual range (BVR) identifi-
cation ROE in lieu of existing ROE requiring visual identification.
Alternatively, if enforcement aircraft with a greater capability to
identify potential intruders deploy into a JTF's tactical area of re-
sponsibility (TAOR), then for legal and policy reasons it may be
wise to make the identification ROE more restrictive, at least vis-
a-vis missions involving such aircraft.
A shift in the ground situation can also require revision. Con-
sider, the combat search and rescue (CSAR) ROE. If there are
friendly forces or friendly indigenous groups in the area, then the
rules of engagement for air support to a downed crew member will
be much less robust than in a region where anyone approaching
the crew member is probably unfriendly. In the former case, a
friendly-fire incident is a concern, thereby making it absolutely es-
sential that those approaching be positively identified. In the lat-
ter, the primary concern will be safe and prompt recovery of the
crewman. If the ground situation changes, then so too should the
ROE (or the guidance thereon). Indeed, any change in the envi-
ronment-political, military, or legal-should occasion a review of
the ROE.134
134. The bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983 is the generally cited ex-
ample of failure in this regard. The Commission found that the "ROE contributed to a
mind-set that detracted from the readiness of the [Marines] to respond to the terrorist
threat which materialized on 23 October 1983." Commission Report, supra note 81, at
135.
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When drafting supplemental ROE, combatant commands
should not attempt to supplement the SROE self-defense rules.
Self-defense is already fully provided for in the SROE to the
maximum extent allowed in international law. Along these same
lines, use of self-defense terms of art such as "hostile act" or "hos-
tile intent" in the combatant command's ROE is also ill-advised,
for combatant commander ROE are mission accomplishment
rules. Attempts to expand or explain the right of self-defense in
the form of supplemental ROE may inadvertently result in inter-
pretations that are inconsistent with the policy aims for the opera-
tion or complicate the exercise of self-defense by enforcement air-
craft.
As a hypothetical example, consider a combatant command
rule of engagement that reads, "Illumination of JTF aircraft by fire
control radar of a surface-to-air missile site is a demonstration of
hostile intent justifying an attack on the emitting site in self-
defense." This seemingly clear rule invites confusion for a number
of reasons. Those experienced in ROE will know that the com-
batant command ROE are intended for mission accomplishment.
Their immediate question will be whether or not this rule sets a
different standard than the SROE self-defense principles, particu-
larly since a basic premise of ROE draftsmanship is to never create
lists of hostile intent. The sense that maybe the rule is but a poorly
articulated effort to set a lower threshold than would normally be
the case for self-defense is strengthened by the operational fact
that the range or altitude parameters of the fire control radar of
some SAM systems significantly exceed their weapons engagement
zone.135 When this is so, illumination may be an unfriendly act,
but it is not a demonstration of hostile intent because no threat can
be posed. 136 By this stream of analysis, the rule is interpreted as a
poorly drafted mission accomplishment rule that allows the SAM
site to be engaged at a point which might not be justified in self-
defense. This is not to say that lowering the threshold would be
unreasonable or unlawful. A mission accomplishment rule along
these lines is in most no-fly contexts a reasonable attempt to create
a safe environment in which to operate. The point is simply that if
135. E.g., the missile may not have the range of the radar associated with the SAM sys-
tem.
136. This rather black and white assertion must be tempered by operational prudence.
For instance, intelligence sources may indicate a missile has a certain range, but it may, in
fact, have a greater range than advertised or previously witnessed.
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the intent is not to alter the existing threshold, the rule invites con-
fusion.
The obverse is equally possible. Given inclusion of the terms
self-defense and hostile intent, a reasonable conclusion would be
that the rule is an attempt to refine the already applicable SROE
self-defense rules. But if the actual intent is to lower the thresh-
old, then that intent will have been frustrated. Conversely, if the
goal is to clarify self-defense, there is a risk that aircraft will hesi-
tate to defend themselves in the face of what would otherwise be a
demonstration of hostile intent until they have been illuminated by
a fire control radar. This is the very danger that the drafting pro-
hibition on lists of acts demonstrating hostile intent is directed
against.
The possibility of confusion is not far-fetched. Envision a
scenario in which multiple enforcement aircraft are in the no-fly
zone. Suddenly, there are several radar warning receiver (RWR)
indications that they are being painted by fire control radar; one
pilot reports seeing a missile on its way up. Meanwhile, another
enforcement aircraft receives a RWR indication of target acquisi-
tion radar associated with a SAM site, but no indication of fire
control radar.137 Standard hostile intent ROE would allow an im-
mediate attack on the site emitting in the acquisition mode. At
least one other ground site has already committed a hostile act,
and activation of acquisition radar by a second site would reasona-
bly appear to be a continuation of the effort to down an enforce-
ment aircraft. Further, some SAM systems are able to fire their
missiles while in target acquisition mode, switching to missile guid-
ance only after the missile has been launched. A rule crafted in
terms of fire control radar could delay appropriate actions in self-
defense against the second site.
The suggestion that combatant command supplemental ROE
is the wrong place to amplify self-defense, and the urging against
lists of acts which constitute a demonstration of hostile intent, does
not mean to imply that rules of engagement should be set forth in
a void of possible scenarios. What it does suggest is that tying
137. Radars operate in various modes. In the acquisition mode, they simply search the
sky for targets. In the target tracking (fire control) mode, they are locked on to and follow
a particular target in preparation for launch. In missile guidance mode, radar guides a
missile that has been launched to target. Whether or not the functions are distinct (and
distinguishable by aircraft) depends on the radar system. For example, the phased array
radar on an Aegis cruiser performs all three functions.
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them to real-world situations is best left to those tasked with the
actual execution of the mission, most often a JTF Commander and
his Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC).
It is at this level that the third, and for the aircrew most criti-
cal, phase of no-fly ROE development and implementation occurs.
Typically, a JTF commander will issue guidance on the application
of the ROE to his aircrews. 138 This guidance should be drafted
jointly by the operation's staff judge advocate, who will be attuned
to legal concerns and the nuances of precision draftsmanship as
well as the JFACC, the officer responsible for operational matters.
The guidance will be issued by the JTF commander, the one indi-
vidual in the organization who best understands the policy man-
date he has been given. Thus, all three underlying components of
the ROE are accounted for in the guidance.
The commander's guidance is not a formal part of the rules of
engagement. Rules of engagement set forth the parameters of
what it is that enforcement aircraft may do. The commander's
guidance on the application of the ROE takes those instructions
and sets out how the tasks will be accomplished. For instance, the
mission accomplishment ROE will state that a particular type of
aircraft violating the no-fly zone may be warned to depart, and if it
does not, engaged. The guidance, by contrast, outlines the form
and content of the warning and the requisite identification criteria
before the violating aircraft may be shot down. It authorizes no
act not already authorized in either the SROE or the combatant
command's supplemental ROE.
Though lengthy by comparison to the ROE, the commander's
guidance should inform crew members how they can defend them-
selves and accomplish the mission, not constitute a legal treatise.
Furthermore, the ROE guidance should be based on various situa-
tion specific factors: the taiked mission, the threat from ground
and air-based systems, capabilities of enforcement assets, and tac-
tical good sense. It must also be subject to a robust legal analysis,
not only for compliance with legal limits/authorizations found in
the ROE, but more generally with international law, especially the
law of armed conflict.
138. The guidance can take multiple forms. In Operation NORTHERN WATCH, e.g., it
is in a booklet entitled the Commander's Guidance on the Application of the Rules of En-
gagement, which is one part of an overall set of guidance labeled the Consolidated Oper-
ating Standards. In SOUTHERN WATCH, by contrast, the guidance is contained in a Spe-
cial Instruction (SPIN) issued by the JTF Commander.
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RECURRING ISSUES
In any no-fly zone operation, there are three seminal goals:
1) no violations; 2) no mistakes; and 3) no friendly losses. The first
is intended to achieve the policy mandate without raising the po-
litical stakes by actually having to shoot down an aircraft that
dares test the zone. Its success depends on deterrence through
credibility, the product of capability and perceived willingness to
enforce. Critical to this deterrence is maintaining control over
when and in what way enforcement aircraft occupy the zone. In
other words, it is important that the target State not be able to
drive enforcement aircraft from the zone, thereby opening it to
their own.139 It is equally important that the engagement decision
matrix not be so involved, or the authority to engage so highly set,
that enforcement aircraft cannot react in a timely fashion.
The second goal, no mistakes, is intended to maintain the in-
ternational political cohesion that made possible establishment of
the zone in the first place. In that no-fly zones are intrusions on
the sovereignty of a State, setting one up is a rather exceptional
decision for the international community to make. Continued le-
gitimacy of the zone depends on strict compliance with the limits
of the mandate by enforcing States.
Lastly, the operation must be mounted safely, both for the
sake of the aircrews involved and to maintain domestic and inter-
national support for the operation. This requires a full under-
standing of what the law of self-defense, and the ROE articulating
it in the operational context, allows. None of these goals can be
achieved without clarity of purpose and execution. In the re-
maining section of this article, several of the recurring issues that
tend to generate confusion or hesitation during no-fly zone opera-
tions will be examined.
Who to Shoot and When? The question of who to shoot is far
more complex than might appear at first glance. To the extent the
policy mandate does not specify the precise subjects of enforce-
ment, the ROE must do so. Of course, those ROE cannot extend
enforcement authority beyond what is a reasonable interpretation
of the mandate, for mission accomplishment rules permitting the
use of force depend on the mandate involved for legality and le-
139. For example, by employing the technique of illuminating aircraft with SAM sys-
tem fire control radars discussed supra in the section on self-defense.
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gitimacy. Effectively drafted mission accomplishment ROE will,
at a minimum, make the following clear for enforcement aircrews.
What nationality are the aircraft that enforcement action can be
taken against? Zone prohibitions should be framed with specificity
in the ROE. Obviously, aircraft of the target State will be in-
cluded. That State, however, might be allied or cooperating with
other States, the aircraft of which may attempt to enter the zone.
If so, decision makers should consider extending the zone's prohi-
bitions to include aircraft of such States. Alternatively, a zone may
be expressed in terms of a general prohibition, with specific air-
craft exempted. For instance, UN aircraft are permitted to fly in
the zones over Iraq, and do so often in their weapons monitoring
role. 140 Similarly, relief or humanitarian flights by specified coun-
tries or organizations may be exempted. Whenever there are ei-
ther exemptions to a general prohibition or specific prohibitions
on aircraft of a certain nationality, rigid identification procedures
must be in effect before a possible violator may be engaged. 14 1 As
the Black Hawks shoot-down so tragically demonstrated, deter-
mining aircraft nationality can be a challenging proposition.
Does the prohibition extend to civil aircraft? There is little
doubt that no-fly zones may be enforced against military air-
craft. 142 The legality of using force against civil aircraft is a far less
settled issue, as the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 (KAL
007) over the Soviet Union in 1983 demonstrated. 143 International
140. The mission is performed by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM).
141. This need is compounded by the distribution of similar aircraft in the air forces of
many States. For instance, during DESERT STORM, both Iraq and menders of the Coali-
tion flew French-made Mirages and Soviet-built MiGs.
142. Over the course of the last fifty years, there have been a number of incidents in
which military aircraft were downed during peacetime operations. For instance, in 1952
and 1954, Soviet aircraft shot down B-29s over Japan, in 1953 a USAF F-84 was downed
by Czech fighters, and the Soviets shot down a U.S. Navy P-2 in 1959. In each case, inter-
national condemnation focused on the fact that the aircraft had inadvertently, vice inten-
tionally, violated foreign airspace. When a U-2 was shot down by the Soviets over Soviet
territory in 1960, however, there was a relative lack of condemnation. These incidents
would tend to support the contention that it is intent of the downed aircraft that will drive
international assessments of legality. In the case of a no-fly zone, the intent of a combat
aircraft to violate an internationally "sanctioned" prohibition approaches res ipsa loquitor
status. On the incidents, and the reaction thereto, see 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Inci-
dent of Oct. 7, 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.); 1959 I.C..J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Nov. 7,
1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.); 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Mar. 10, 1953 (U.S. v.
Czech); 1958 I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Sept. 4, 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.); Schmitt,
Aerial Blockades, supra note 7, at 51-52.
143. One hundred six deaths resulted. KAL 007 was certainly not the first incident of
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outrage was expressed loudly and immediately. But for a Soviet
veto, the Security Council would have passed a resolution declar-
ing that "such use of force against international aviation is incom-
patible with the norms governing international behavior and ele-
mentary considerations of humanity." 144 The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) approved a resolution containing
identical language. 145 Following a fact-finding commission review
of the incident, the ICAO Council subsequently reaffirmed that
"whatever the circumstances which... may have caused the air-
craft to stray off its flight plan route, such use of armed force con-
stitutes a violation of international law, and invokes generally rec-
ognized legal consequences.' 146 Not long thereafter, the ICAO
Assembly adopted a proposal for amendment of the Chicago Con-
vention. Article 3 bis provides that "the contracting states recog-
nize that every state must refrain from resorting to the use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of intercep-
tion, the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft
must not be endangered.' 1 47 Though it has yet to secure the 102
ratifications necessary to come into effect, there is some support
for the position that it is in fact declaratory of existing customary
law.148
a civil airliner being downed. In 1954 the Chinese shot down a Cathay Pacific airliner
which they mistakenly believed to be a Nationalist Chinese military aircraft. Keesings
Contemporary Archives 13733 (1954). Other incidents of downing civil airliners include
downings of: an Air France airliner over Berlin in 1952; an El Al airliner in 1955 by Bul-
garia; a Libyan airliner by the Israelis over the Sinai Peninsula in 1973; and the forced
landing of a Korean Air Lines aircraft in 1983 by the Soviets. See Schmitt, Aerial Block-
ades, supra note 7, at 52. See also Bin Cheng, The Destruction of KAL Flight KEO07, and
Article 3 Bis of the Chicago Convention, in AIRWORTHY: LIBER AMICORUM
HONOURING PROFESSOR DR. I.H. PH. DIERDERICKS-VERSCHOOR 49, 55 (J.W.E. Storm
van Gravesande & A. van der Veen Vonk eds., 1985); Craig A. Morgan, The Shooting of
Korean Airlines Flight 007: Responses to Unauthorized Intrusions, in INTERNATIONAL
INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 202, 204-210 (W. Michael
Reisman & Andrew Willard eds., 1988); and John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and
Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255,266-274 (1985).
144. The text of the draft resolution (S/15966/Rev. 1) is reprinted at 22 I.L.M. 1148
(1983). Poland also voted against the resolution, and the P.R.C., Guyana, Nicaragua, and
Zimbabwe abstained. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2476 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1138, 1144
(1983).
145. ICAO Council Resolution, Sept. 16, 1983,22 I.L.M. 1150 (1983).
146. ICAO Council Resolution, Mar. 6, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 937 (1984).
147. Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Article 3 bis), May 10, 1984, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 707 (1984).
148. Use of the term "recognize," in light of rules of interpretation, would suggest it
was intended to be declaratory. For a discussion of Article 3 bis, see Cheng, supra note
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Despite the crescendo of condemnation following KAL 007,
the existence of a Security Council Chapter VII mandate would
arguably allow enforcement against a civil aircraft in a no-fly zone,
even if downing it would otherwise violate international law. The
Charter is, as discussed earlier, supreme. Nevertheless, it should
be obvious that any downing of civilian aircraft would be highly
controversial, regardless of its purported legality. Therefore, be-
fore drafting ROE vis-A-vis civil aircraft, it must be absolutely
clear that the original mandate authorizing the zone was intended
to cover them; during post-incident furor over a civil aircraft
shoot-down is the wrong time to discover that it does not.
Even if it is clear that such action is authorized by the man-
date, the authorization level for actually engaging should remain at
a level where the decision maker can factor in the policy and po-
litical environment then existing. The fact that one can shoot
down a civil aircraft violating a no-fly zone does not mean that one
should. Downing armed fighters that violate the zone is relatively
straightforward from a policy perspective; shooting down civilian
aircraft is an entirely different matter. Not only should the ap-
proval level be highly placed, but the steps that the enforcement
aircraft must perform before it may engage a civil aircraft in mis-
sion accomplishment need to be very carefully considered. In par-
ticular, the ROE (and commander's guidance on the application of
the ROE) must ensure positive identification and impose redun-
dant warning requirements. The warning requirement is particu-
larly important-it acts to shift the onus of responsibility for the
shoot-down to the violating aircraft. Additionally, because civil
aircraft are being intercepted, tactical guidance for intercept
methodology should comply with the procedures set forth by
ICAO. 149
Finally, in determining if, when, and how to engage civil air-
craft, account should be taken of what it is they are doing. The
closer the aircraft is to performing a military function, the less the
political risk. It is likely that ROE or ROE guidance based on
143, at 60-61; Gerald F. Fitzgerald, The Use of Force Against Civil Aircraft: The Aftermath
of the KAL 007 Incident, 1984 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 291; Michael Milde, The Chicago Con-
vention After 40 Years, 9 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE LAW 119 (1984).
149. Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944,
annex 2 (Rules of the Air), 15 U.N.T.S. 295, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 61 Stat. (2) 1180, 3 Bevans
944, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1154 (1983). See also, Schmitt, Aerial Blockades, supra note 7,
at 56-64.
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what the aircraft is doing may prove difficult to execute. Even
with a visual (VID) intercept, it may be impossible to determine if
it is carrying military or humanitarian relief supplies. Neverthe-
less, in certain circumstances, ROE based on act (e.g., air-dropping
supplies) may make sense. Of course, if a civil aircraft commits a
hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent necessitating a response
in self-defense, enforcement aircraft may defend themselves.
Does the type of aircraft make a difference? When the two
Black Hawk helicopters were downed over northern Iraq, some
criticism was voiced because the helicopters posed no serious
threat to the two F-15s. What is forgotten in this assertion is that
mission accomplishment ROE were applied in the shoot-down; a
threat is not generally a prerequisite in these rules. The question
of whether the F-15s were threatened by the helicopters (if they
had actually been Iraqi Hinds) 150 is one of self-defense; in fact,
there was never any claim that the F-15s mistakenly acted in self-
defense.
The incident highlights the fact that the type of aircraft vio-
lating the zone matters when contemplating enforcement action.
The more offensively capable the aircraft, the more acceptable the
enforcement action, and the less likelihood of negative impact on
the policy aims underlying the zone. Understanding this fact is
useful in crafting ROE and ROE guidance that is responsive to the
policy component of the rules of engagement.
When considering criteria and intercept procedures based on
type of aircraft, probably the cleanest distinction that can be made,
at least from the perspective of the enforcement aircraft's cockpit,
is between fighter/attack aircraft, transport aircraft, and helicop-
ters. Whether the three should be handled differently depends on
the context in which the no-fly zone exists. If helicopters have
been active in air-to-ground operations, the need to distinguish be-
tween engaging fighters and helicopters is minimal. Both are of-
fensively oriented threats to the maintenance of peace. By the
same reasoning, if establishment of the zone was primarily in re-
sponse to the threat to peace posed by ground attack aircraft, it
may be prudent to set different procedures for responding to heli-
copters and transports. This certainly is not required as a matter
150. The F-15 pilots misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi Mi-24 Hinds during their
visual identification. See Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report, Executive Sum-
mary, Vol. I (May 27, 1994) at 3 (on file with author).
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of law so long as the mandate covers all military aircraft, but it is a
prudent political step to take. The point is that enforcement pro-
cedures and criteria must reflect attendant conditions; type of air-
craft is one variable ROE drafters and enforcement operation
commanders should consider to ensure this.
If a decision is made to treat varying types of aircraft differ-
ently, the differences will lie primarily in identification and warn-
ing. Because of the high risk involved in flying close enough to
fighter/attack aircraft to visually identify them, it is appropriate to
authorize beyond visual range identification and engagement in
most circumstances. By contrast, since they pose minimal threat to
high performance fighter aircraft, a visual identification of helicop-
ters and transports is ordinarily a reasonable requirement from a
tactical perspective. If tactically acceptable, doing so would cer-
tainly make sense from a legal or policy perspective.
Differences in the warning requirement take two forms, pro-
cedural and substantive. Procedurally, the ICAO intercept proce-
dures are viable in the case of helicopters or transports, but would
not be when intercepting a fighter aircraft with air-to-air capabil-
ity. Substantively, the nature of a particular operation may justify
dispensing with the warning requirement altogether for fighters, or
even for helicopters if they have previously been involved in offen-
sive operations. Violating the zone may alone be sufficient justifi-
cation for engaging them. On the other hand, and again in situa-
tion-specific scenarios, it may be politically judicious to warn
helicopters or transport aircraft out of the area before acting to
shoot them down.
Who authorizes engagement of violators? Whereas the
authority to act in self-defense must reside in the cockpit, the deci-
sion as to when to engage in a mission accomplishment intercept
can be set at whatever level makes sense from a policy and opera-
tional perspective.' 5 ' Context is controlling. The more politically
151. Legally, it does not matter where the level is set, so long as the execution of the
engagement, and the criteria therefore, are appropriate. Of course, the system of authori-
zation cannot be so complex that it fails to function effectively. It has been argued that
during DENY FLIGHT, the requirement to secure both NATO and UN approval for the
use of force (in mission accomplishment) frustrated accomplishment of the mission. The
problem was not that of connectivity (i.e., technology for communications), but rather un-
wieldy and slow decision-making. See Brian G. Gawne, Dual Key Command and Control
in Operation Deny Flight: Paralyzed by Design (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on
file at NWC library).
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sensitive a particular type of engagement, the higher the authoriza-
tion level should be set. 152 For example, if consistent with the op-
erational context, the decision may be made to let the aircrew of
the enforcement aircraft determine when to engage a fighter, but
require a decision by the JFACC or task force commander to en-
gage anything else. The most sensitive issues surround civil air-
craft. It would be unwise to let aircrew act against civil aircraft
without higher approval; the political consequences of the act are
simply too momentous.
Who to Defend? As noted earlier, U.S. aircraft may always
defend themselves or other U.S. military assets. No supplemental
rule is required to effectuate this right. This core principle extends
to all U.S. military assets, whether assigned to the task force or
not. Thus, if Iraqi forces engaged U-2 flights operating in support
of the UN weapons monitoring operation (United Nations Special
Commission-UNSCOM), as was threatened, U.S. forces of either
SOUTHERN or NORTHERN WATCH could act in their de-
fense without any further approval. 153
Beyond that, a specific supplemental rule must be issued to
authorize defense of forces of any other State or organization. In
most cases, there will be a supplemental rule authorizing defense
of all aircraft participating in monitoring the no-fly zone. Careful
review of the scope of the authorization is well-advised. Does it
only apply to aircraft assigned to the operation or to aircraft of
those States generally? 154 Are there geographical limits placed on
the exercise of this collective self-defense? 155 Are there any tacti-
cal limits?
As a matter of law, States may not unilaterally extend protec-
tion to other States absent their consent. 15 6 Collective defense
152. For instance, in the case of the four Galebs shot down by NATO fighters in 1994,
they were first warned by NATO AWACS monitoring the area. They then were warned
off by the fighters. After these warnings went unheeded, the fighters had to secure
authority from the NATO Combined Air Operations Center before they could engage the
violators. Nash, supra note 52, at 524.
153. On the threats, see Containing Saddam, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 1997, at 16;
Saddam v. the UN, Continued, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 1997, at 43.
154. For example, if operations are run out of a base in country X, can country X's air-
craft be defended even if they are engaged in operations wholly unrelated to the no-fly
enforcement operation? The default answer is no, absent authorization to the contrary.
155. For example, do the ROE permit forces to cross a border in order to effectively
defend X's aircraft?
156. Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 104-05.
1998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ROE should not be approved until such a request has been re-
ceived; generally, this will occur during the planning phase of the
operation. An interesting derivation of this premise involves the
extent of self-defense authorized. If the protected State's interpre-
tation of self-defense is narrower than the U.S. interpretation, e.g.,
by limiting self-defense to hostile acts, may U.S. aircraft neverthe-
less act based on their own standard (which includes notions of
hostile intent)? The answer is technically "yes," because intent is
an appropriate criterion for self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which does not distinguish between State, individual,
and collective defense. They should do so, however, only if the
consent of the protected State is express. 157 This position is a logi-
cal extension of the ab initio need for consent to collective self-
defense.
Extension of direct defense to international governmental or-
ganizations (e.g., UN), non-governmental organizations (e.g., relief
organizations), or any other groups that may be threatened (e.g.,
the Kurds) also requires specific authorization. As in the case of
States, a request for such assistance should precede its execution.
This point bears only on the issue of immediately necessary self-
defense of such organizations and groups. Beyond that, mission
accomplishment ROE may be fashioned to implement a national
policy providing for their defense.
The question of defense involves not only who to defend, but
also against whom. For U.S. forces defending themselves, the
SROE rule is clear-anyone. The matter is murkier when de-
fending forces of other States or organizations. A coalition part-
ner may be engaged in entirely separate operations in the target
State or have disputes with neighbors unrelated to the no-fly zone
enforcement. 158 To come to the defense of its aircraft in other
than the no-fly zone enforcement context is to risk creating the
impression that the U.S. or its coalition allies have taken sides in
an unrelated dispute. When this potential exists, ROE and/or the
guidance issued thereon must be carefully drafted to ensure collec-
tive defense is engaged in only as it pertains to the no-fly operation
itself.
157. Of course, this begs the policy question of why U.S. forces should place them-
selves at risk in circumstances in which a State's own forces would not do so.
158. The classic example is cross-border operations during Operations PROVIDE
COMFORT and NORTHERN WATCH against Kurds using northern Iraq as a sanctuary in
their war against the Turks. Turkey is also at odds on a recurring basis with Syria.
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Where Can Enforcement Aircraft Fly... and Enforce? There
are few principles more established in international law than terri-
torial inviolability. This inviolability extends not only to physical
crossings of international borders, but also to the causation of
harmful effects in other States.159 Control over airspace by a State
is near absolute within its land borders and territorial sea; it is even
more absolute skyward to the point where space begins. 160 The
three exceptions to the need for State consent prior to entry into
national airspace are flights pursuant to a Chapter VII authoriza-
tion (e.g., a no-fly zone), necessity in a self-defense situation, force
majeure, and assistance entry when immediately necessary to save
lives. Each applies in the no-fly zone context, and ROE and ROE
guidance should reflect the relevant legal principles.
First, because of the principle of territorial inviolability, an
ROE supplemental rule must specifically authorize the crossing of
international borders. The legal basis for the authority to cross
into the target State is obviously the Security Council's express or
implied mandate. Beyond that, consent would be required to cross
any ocher borders necessary to enforce the zone. If not granted,
violators could not be pursued into neighboring States. An oft-
heard contrary assertion is that they may be chased across interna-
tional borders when enforcement aircraft are in "hot pursuit. ' ' 161
The assertion is mistaken, for the term hot pursuit is a legal con-
cept limited to either law enforcement or the proportional protec-
tion of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the pursuit is typically
from the enforcement State's territory into international airspace,
159. Trail Smelter was a case involving a smelter that was discharging sulfur dioxide
near Trail, British Columbia. The United States alleged that the sulfur dioxide drifted
over parts of Washington. The arbitration tribunal held for the United States on the
ground that countries have a duty not to use, or allow the use of, their territory for activi-
ties harmful to another State. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 (1941).
160. See AFP 110-31, supra note 111, at 11 2-5; DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M),
2.5.1 (1995). Note for example, that in the law of the sea there is a right to innocent pas-
sage through the territorial sea. No such right exists in the airspace. NWP 1-14M, id. at
2.5.1.
161. For an excellent discussion of aerial hot pursuit, see N.M. POULANTZAS, THE
RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 271-352 (1969). Roach cites a form of
pursuit labeled "self-defense pursuit," distinguishing it from the hot pursuit of the law of
the sea. Roach, supra note 4, at 50. Self-defense pursuit would certainly be appropriate in
the aerial environment; however, because of the speeds involved, it would be less a pursuit
than merely an ongoing engagement.
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not into the sovereign airspace of a third State.162 There being no
international legal doctrine of hot pursuit per se applicable to a no-
fly zone operation, any pursuit that occurs must be based on the
authorizing mandate or consent. Where pursuit is generally ap-
propriate is in pursuing a violating aircraft back across a no-fly line
within the target State. Since the flight is into the target State's
airspace, permitting enforcement aircraft to pursue such violators
is a reasonable interpretation of the mandate, absent indications
otherwise that it was not so intended.
Another argument sometimes heard is that if violating aircraft
use neighboring States as sanctuary from enforcement aircraft, and
the "host" States fail to act effectively to preclude that practice
from continuing, then enforcement aircraft may cross the relevant
border to deny violating aircraft de facto sanctuary.163 This is im-
permissible without express or implied Security Council authoriza-
tion. The right to cross borders in self-help derives from applica-
tion of the law of neutrality and the existence of opposing
belligerents. 164 No-fly operations usually occur, however, in the
absence of classic belligerency between the States enforcing the
zone and the target State. Additionally, Security Council ap-
proved actions are typically specific as to the identity of the target
of the sanctions. The sanctuary State is not yet one. That being
so, additional authorization should be sought before crossing bor-
ders not encompassed by the original grant of authority.165
162. Poulantzas describes incidents of pursuit during armed conflicts not amounting to
war, rejecting the contention that a right to enter a third State's territory exists absent con-
sent. POULANTZAS, supra note 161, at 329-338.
163. Note that the State would be obligated to act to keep its territory from becoming
a sanctuary by virtue of Article 2 (5) of the Charter. That article provides that "[aill
Members... shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Na-
tions is taking preventive or enforcement action." U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (5).
164. The classic case on sanctuary in the law of armed conflict involves the Altmark, a
German naval auxiliary vessel during the Second World War. In 1940, the Altmark tran-
sited Norwegian territorial waters carrying British prisoners. Permission to transit had
been granted by the Norwegians, who had also refused British requests that the vessel be
searched for prisoners. After the Altmark had passed through nearly 400 miles of Norwe-
gian waters, a British destroyer entered the waters and released the prisoners. The British
justified their action in part on the basis that the German vessel was using Norwegian wa-
ters improperly as sanctuary. On the incident, see ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF
WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 236-39 (50 Naval War College International Law Stud-
ies, 1955).
165. A colorable argument could be offered that crossing into the sanctuary State
would be authorized by the original mandate because the sanctuary State is unable or un-
willing to comply with its own obligations under the Charter. Doing so, however, may
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The major exception for no-fly zone enforcement border-
crossing authority involves self-defense. There is no geographical
limitation to the inherent right of self-defense. Enforcement air-
craft defending themselves or others may cross or shoot across any
borders in self-defense. For example, if an intruder aircraft illumi-
nates an enforcement aircraft with its fire control radar from
across a neighboring border, a response in self-defense may be
necessary. The existence of the border should not affect the air-
crew's decision to defend. Further, in an actual air-to-air engage-
ment, the existence of all aspect missiles and the ability of high
performance aircraft to rapidly turn and engage often make it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to ascertain when an engagement has bro-
ken off. As a result, enforcement aircraft may sometimes have to
"pursue" intruder aircraft across borders while the engagement is
ongoing. Recalling that this is an act in self-defense, rather than
one in mission accomplishment, the pursuit (really the continua-
tion of the engagement) is legal so long as the aircrew's belief that
they are still engaged and need to defend themselves is reasonable.
Since each of these situations is based on the right to self-defense,
no specific supplemental ROE are required.
Force majeure is the principle of international law that a State
must allow an aircraft in distress (from weather, mechanical prob-
lems, etc.) to enter its airspace and land if no other safe alternative
is available to it. Note that the right of military aircraft to claim
force majeure entry is unsettled.166 Nevertheless, given the alter-
native, which may very well be bailing out over the territory of the
no-fly zone target State, the logical course of action in most cases
is to at least attempt entry on the basis of force majeure.
Finally, the right of assistance entry is the right to enter a
State's territorial sea or airspace to effect the rescue of a downed
crew member at sea.167 Whether it extends to downed crew mem-
present a very real threat in terms of an intercept on enforcement aircraft by sanctuary
aircraft alleging a violation of their airspace. Further, it would certainly be less politically
disruptive to allow the Security Council to address the matter.
166. The Air Force law of war manual states that "No settled international rule per-
mits intrusion of military aircraft into national airspace on the grounds of mistake, duress,
distress or other force majeure." AFP 110-31, supra note 111, IJ 2-5d. The Navy version,
by contrast notes that "(a)ircraft in distress are entitled to special consideration and
should be allowed entry and emergency landing rights." NWP 1-14M, supra note 160,
2.5.1.
167. The right of assistance entry into airspace is less settled. On the U.S. policy re-
garding assistance entry, see Joint Staff, Guidance for the Exercise of Right of Assistance
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bers on land is unsettled. Arguably, it is an obligation of the State
in whose territory a downed crew member is located to come to
the aid of such a person.168 If that State is not attempting to re-
cover the crew member or refuses to consent to entry of the rescue
aircraft from the enforcement forces, and it appears the lives of the
crew are at risk due to injuries or the elements, then a colorable
claim exists that, under the doctrine of self-help, rescue forces may
enter for the very limited purpose of recovering the crew.
Miscellaneous Issues. There are a myriad of context-specific
issues that arise during no-fly-zone operations, the resolution of
which depends on an extremely close working relationship be-
tween judge advocates and operators. Many arise in the air-to-
ground arena. The key to effective air-to-ground ROE is to focus
on the distinction between the self-defense and mission accom-
plishment ROE. Mission accomplishment ROE, designed to cre-
ate a benign environment in which to enforce the zone, should
never be mistaken for self-defense ROE, which are intended to
ensure an enforcement aircraft an adequate defense against a hos-
tile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
Along these lines, a pervasive issue is the identification crite-
ria for engaging SAM sites in mission accomplishment. It is not
unusual for there to be spurious indications on an aircraft's RWR
gear of SAM site activity. Therefore, mission accomplishment
ROE may require multiple indicators which must be received be-
fore a site may be engaged in mission accomplishment. After all,
in order for deterrence to work, the entity to be deterred must be
able to determine clearly at which of its acts the response was
aimed. The criteria, however, in no way affect a crew's response in
self-defense. Aircrews need to be sensitive to the likelihood of
spurious returns and factor that reality into their determination of
whether a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent has oc-
curred. That said, the decision to engage in self-defense is theirs
alone to make, regardless of whether mission accomplishment cri-
teria have been met.
Entry (CJCSI 2410.01A), Apr. 23, 1997.
168. In fact, there is just such an obligation in international agreements for the recov-
ery of astronauts. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. V,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Agreement on the Res-
cue of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, arts. 1-4, Apr.
22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599,672 U.N.T.S. 119.
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Another common air-to-ground scenario involves combat
search and rescue operations. As noted earlier, a crucial question
is when may supporting aircraft engage ground forces approaching
the downed crew member. As with any self-defense situation, the
ROE and commander's guidance should avoid creating checklists
of acts demonstrating hostile intent. It may cite sample indicators
though, caveating the list with the need to apply them contextu-
ally. Relevant factors may include the reason the crew member is
down (hostile fire or mechanical problems?), who controls the ter-
ritory he is in (the target State or indigenous groups friendly to the
enforcement operation), and who is approaching him and what
their reaction is to measures short of the use of force, such as the
presence of enforcement aircraft. The commander's guidance
should also set forth who controls the decision that a response in
defense of the downed crew is necessary, lest the recovery opera-
tion become disjointed. The decision should rest with the on-scene
commander, though the commander's guidance must make clear
who is serving in that role.169
In both these examples, basing ROE oi sound intelligence
and tactics is crucial to success. The determination of whether an
act in self-defense is necessary in the face of fire control radar il-
lumination may need to turn on whether the SAM system is mo-
bile or not. If intelligence is generally reliable and an enforcement
aircraft receives a RWR indication of a non-mobile SAM site from
a location at which there is no known site, that should cause less
concern (possibly a spurious hit) than an indication of a mobile
SAM that may have been placed there under the cover of dark-
ness. Similarly, recall the discussion of the threat system's WEZ
when considering defensive actions. Some might be lulled into
complacency when they receive an indication of a SAM that can-
not reach their altitude. Yet, good intelligence work may indicate
that it is possible to use the radar of that particular system to feed
data to another system armed with a missile of greater altitude ca-
pabilities. This intelligence data will likely be determinative in as-
sessing whether to engage in self-defense.
169. As a practical matter, in a CSAR situation it may be more dangerous to attempt
to defend the downed crew member than seek "repatriation" after capture. The on-scene
commander must direct only tactically sound and safe procedures unlikely to worsen the
crew member's situation.
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In the air-to-air environment, a recurring concern is the de-
gree of certainty necessary before engaging a violator. 170 There is
no easy answer to this dilemma. As a general rule, the best ap-
proach is to require all reasonably available systems to attempt to
identify a target before it is engaged if it poses no threat. Not only
would this require visual identification, but it would also necessi-
tate a call by any command and control aircraft working the area
(such as an AWACS) that it had no indications the target was any-
thing but a wrongful violator. Additional sources of information
that should be considered include intelligence information, the lo-
cation of the aircraft when it was first noted (e.g., was it in the tar-
get State), on-board electronic identification systems that en-
forcement aircraft possess, non-responsiveness to warnings, and
identify friend or foe (IFF) squawks (or the absence thereof). 171
The further one moves along the continuum toward aircraft which
pose a threat, the more authorization of beyond visual range iden-
tification and engagement may be appropriate. Of course, identi-
fication criteria should never serve to keep an aircraft from de-
fending itself against what it reasonably believes to constitute a
threat under the self-defense rules of engagement.
Rules of engagement, and the commander's guidance on
ROE issued to implement them, are tools for integrating policy,
legal, and operational concerns and limits during a no-fly zone op-
eration. It is absolutely critical that all three concerns be carefully
factored into their development, for the speed with which the aer-
ial picture unfolds is such that ROE for no-fly zones must be very
precisely and carefully crafted if the political mandate is to be im-
plemented at minimum risk. As the Black Hawks incident so
tragically illustrated, there is no room for error.
170. The risk of a mistake is two-fold. First, there are aircraft which are not forbidden
to fly in the zone (e.g., relief aircraft). Secondly, there is always the possibility of a blue-
on-blue engagement, i.e., one in which a friendly aircraft is engaged. For a brief discussion
of this latter issue, see Paul M. Ziegler, Considerations for the Development of Theater
Hostilities Rules of Engagement: Blue-on-Blue Versus Capability Sacrifice (Nov. 1992)
(unpublished manuscript on file at NWC library).
171. On the issue of IFF squawks, see Coe & Schmitt, supra note 82, at 78-79. The
importance of IFF was tragically demonstrated in the Black Hawk incident. The helicop-
ters were squawking a Mode I code that was incorrect for the location they were in. The
Mode IV code for "friendly" was only received momentarily by the lead F-15. The wing-
man received no Mode IV response. It remains unexplained as to why the Mode IV inter-
rogation was unsuccessful. Board Report, Executive Summary, supra note 150, at 5.
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Ultimately, two themes must pervade the development of ef-
fective ROE for no-fly zone enforcement. First, the distinction be-
tween self-defense and mission accomplishment rules has to be
clear on the face of the ROE and any guidance thereon. If not, ei-
ther the mission or the crews who execute it will be placed at risk.
Second, the importance of ensuring that operational concerns are
addressed in the ROE and guidance is paramount. Effective ROE
are the product of a firm grasp not only on the law and the founda-
tional policy objectives of the operation, but also operational real-
ity. Abstract legal or policy discourses only serve to obfuscate the
guidance aircrews need to succeed and survive.

